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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation studies trust management for mobile computing platforms. 
Concretely, we study methodologies and mechanisms to provide a trustworthy 
computing platform for mobile devices. Further, we seek solutions to support 
trusted communications and collaboration among those platforms in a distributed 
and dynamic system.  
 
 
 
1.1 Trust and Its Derivatives 
 
The concept of trust has been studied in disciplines ranging from economics to 
psychology, from sociology to medicine, and to information science. It is hard to 
say what trust exactly is because it is a multidimensional, multidiscipline and 
multifaceted concept. We can find various definitions of trust in the literature. 
Common to these definitions are the notions of confidence, belief, faith, hope, 
expectation, dependence, and reliance on the goodness, strength, reliability, 
integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing. 
Generally, a trust relationship involves two parties: a trustor and a trustee. The 
trustor is the person or entity who holds confidence, belief, faith, hope, expectation, 
dependence, and reliance on the goodness, strength, reliability, integrity, ability, or 
character of another person or thing, which is the object of trust - the trustee.  
 
 
1.2 Computing Platforms 
 
1.2.1 Mobile Computing Platform 
 
A computing platform is a framework, either in hardware or software, which allows 
software to run. A typical mobile computing platform includes a mobile device's 
architecture, operating system, or programming languages and their runtime 
libraries. Generally, a mobile computing platform contains three layers: an 
application layer that provides features to a user; a middleware layer that provides 
functionality to applications; and, a foundational platform layer that includes the OS 
and provides access to lower-level hardware. 
 
1.2.2 Trusted Computing Platform 
 
A trusted computing platform is a computing platform that behaves in a way as it is 
expected to behave for an intended purpose. For example, the most important work 
about the trusted computing (TC) platform is conducted in the Trusted Computing 
Group (TCG) [Tcg03]. It defines and promotes open standards for hardware-
enabled trusted computing and security technologies, including hardware building 
blocks and software interfaces, across multiple platforms, peripherals, and devices. 
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TCG specified technology enables more secure computing environments without 
compromising functional integrity, privacy, or individual rights. 
 
1.2.3 Component Software Platform 
 
A component software platform is a type of computing platform that supports the 
execution of software components. The concept of software component builds on 
prior theories of software objects, software architectures, software frameworks and 
software design patterns, and the extensive theory of object-oriented programming 
and object-oriented design of all these. It is expected that a software component, 
like the idea of a hardware component, can be ultimately made interchangeable and 
reliable. The component software platform can play as a concrete middleware layer 
inside a mobile computing platform. 
 
 
1.3 Motivations of Trust Management for Mobile Computing Platforms 
 
Trust management is becoming an important issue for the mobile computing 
platforms. Firstly, mobile commerce and mobile services hold the yet unfulfilled 
promise to revolutionize the way we conduct our personal, organizational and 
public business. Some attribute the problem to the lack of a mobile computing 
platform that all the players may trust enough. Nowadays, it is very hard to build up 
a long-term trust relationship among manufactures, service/application providers 
and mobile users. This could be the main reason that retards the further 
development of mobile applications and services. 
On the other hand, new mobile networking is raising with the fast development 
of mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) and local wireless communication 
technology. It is more convenient for mobile users to communicate in their 
proximity to exchange digital information in various circumstances. However, the 
special characteristics of the new mobile networking paradigms introduce 
additional challenges on security [ZhH99, YZV03]. This introduces special 
requirements for the mobile computing platform to embed trust management 
mechanisms for supporting trustworthy mobile communications. 
More interesting and strange phenomena is that current mobile systems are 
designed based on the assumptions that a) the user trusts his/her device totally; or b) 
the user has to trust a service provider; or c) the user has no choice except using 
some manufacture’s device in order to deploy some mobile applications or mobile 
services. Generally, the systems are not designed considering the users’ trust 
preferences or standards, thus the systems produced are hard to be finally accepted 
by the end users.  
In addition, the growing importance of the third party software in the domain of 
component software platforms introduces special requirements on trust. 
Particularly, the system’s trustworthiness is varied due to component joining and 
leaving. How to manage trust in such a platform is crucial for embedded devices, 
such as mobile phones. 
All of the above problems influence further development of mobile applications 
and services targeting at different areas, such as mobile enterprise, mobile 
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networking and mobile computing. The key reason is that we lack a trust 
management solution for mobile computing platforms. 
 
 
1.4 Research Issues 
 
In this section, we identify the research issues that are worthy of special efforts. 
 
1.4.1 Methodology Development 
 
First of all, we need methodologies to model trust for an intended purpose, and thus 
to build up a trusted system by applying the model. There are various 
methodologies that can be applied for solving different issues. Some trust models 
are based on sound technologies, e.g. PKI [Per99]. A big number of trust models 
are built up targeting at some trust properties, such as reputations, recommendations 
and risk [XiL03, LiS05]. Many trust models have been constructed for various 
computing paradigms such as GRID computing, ad hoc networks, peer-to-peer 
networks, and multi-agent systems, etc. [ZWW05, ThB06, LVW04]. In those 
models, some are computational, others are linguistic or graphic. For example, in 
[Jos99], Subjective Logic is used to assess trust values based on the triplet 
representation of trust. In [Man98], linguistic trust metrics are used for reasoning 
out trust with provided rules. In the context of the “Web of Trust,” many trust 
models are built upon a graph where the resources/entities are nodes and trust 
relationships are edges, such as in [ReS98].  
Although a variety of trust models are available, it is still not well understood 
what fundamental criteria the trust models must follow. Without a good answer to 
this question, the design of trust models is still at an empirical stage [SYH06]. 
Current work focuses on concrete solutions in special systems. Particularly, there 
are no feasible trust modeling methodologies available that can be applied into the 
mobile computing platform in a common way. Thus, we lack general instructions 
when we are designing, analyzing and developing a trusted mobile system. 
 
1.4.2 Personal Trusted Device 
 
The second issue is how to provide a personal trusted device (PTD) for the mobile 
users. This is because establishing a trusted mobile environment requires a trusted 
mobile computing platform as a corner stone. 
Three problems need to be solved herein. Firstly, we need a trusted mobile 
computing platform capable of trustworthy code interaction in an efficient way. The 
mobile device platform layer should provide essential security services, such as 
authenticated booting, encryption service, secure storage, privacy support and 
digital rights management. Trusted Computing Group (TCG) set its goal towards 
maintaining the privacy of the platform owner while providing a ubiquitous 
interoperable mechanism to validate the identity and integrity of a computing 
platform [Tcg03]. However, due to the small size of mobile devices and a different 
computing platform structure from personal computers, this technology needs to be 
adapted for hand-held products. This work is still on-going at the TCG. 
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Secondly, the platform’s middleware runtime layer should provide a mechanism 
to support trustworthy cooperation of multiple software components, thus ensuring 
that device applications can be executed as required and expected regarding system 
dependability, security and adaptability. The device platform should be capable of 
monitoring system performance and adaptively arranging limited device resources 
(such as power, memory, network capability and CPU) in order to fulfill trust 
requirements of different applications and services even in a dynamically changed 
context. The platform could further overcome system threats with a preventable and 
tolerant measure. It should be adaptive to the changes in the software running 
environment due to new components execution and old one’s deletion, as well as 
the changes raised outside the device. Based on our literature study, little work is 
conducted in this area, especially for the mobile devices [ZMZ05].  
Thirdly, we need the PTD to ensure the trust relationship established for an 
intended purpose and sustained until the purpose is fulfilled. This is crucial for 
trusted mobile commerce and services. In one word, the PTD will become the 
mobile user’s trust authority in mobile commerce and communications. The TC 
platform was proposed to improve the trust between users and their devices. The 
TCG’s TC technology ensures this through a set of hardware and software 
mechanisms. However, current work on TC platform lacks solutions for trust 
sustaining among computing platforms, so that trust loyalty might be broken after a 
period of time. This problem may influence the completion of a trustworthy 
transaction or service conducted between two platforms. 
 
1.4.3 Trusted Mobile Communications 
 
The third issue is how to provide trusted mobile communications in both a 
dynamically changed public domain and an organization’s enterprise domain.  
In the public domain, future mobile networking is most possibly in an ad hoc 
style randomly organized by mobile devices. Operation in an ad hoc network 
introduces new security problems. The ad hoc networks are generally more prone to 
physical security threats. The possibility of eavesdropping, spoofing, denial-of-
service, and impersonation attacks increases. But security approaches used for the 
fixed networks are not feasible due to the salient characteristics of the ad hoc 
networks. New threats, such as attacks raised from malicious nodes, are hard to 
defend against. New security mechanisms are needed to adapt to the special 
characteristics of the ad hoc networks. A trust evaluation based security solution we 
developed could be an effective approach for data protection, secure routing and 
other network activities [YZV03]. It can also cooperate with a TC platform based 
solution to provide improved trust in a MANET. Such combined solutions are 
seldom studied in the literature and practiced in industry. 
Mobile peer-to-peer computing has emerged as a significant paradigm for 
providing distributed services, in particular collaboration for content sharing and 
distributed computing. Generally, a mobile P2P system consists of a decentralized 
and self-organizing network of autonomous devices that interact as peers. Each peer 
acts as both client and server to share its resources with other peers. However, this 
computing paradigm suffers from several drawbacks that obstruct its wide adoption. 
Lack of trust between peers is one of the most serious issues, which causes security 
challenges in the P2P systems. Building up trust collaboration among the system 
peers is a key issue to overcome. 
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In the enterprise domain, trust plays a key role in the context of VPN. However, 
providing advanced trust into mobile VPN networks has proven to be problematic. 
Generally, mobile enterprise networking is composed of various devices provided 
by different vendors with different security support. Trust management of 
confidential digital contents at different enterprise devices in different domains (e.g. 
a public networking domain and a virtual private network domain that are either 
trusted or distrusted) is a new challenge worth special efforts. 
The new paradigm of mobile communications introduces additional 
requirements of trust management for the mobile computing platforms. 
 
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
 
The objective of this research is to study trust management for mobile computing 
platforms. This dissertation concentrates especially on the following aspects: 
 
• Study the state-of-the-art of trust management and specify its emerging 
trends in order to propose trust management solutions for the mobile 
computing platforms; 
 
• Develop suitable methodologies for trust management that can instruct the 
designing, analyzing and developing of a trusted mobile system; 
 
• Embed dynamic support of trust into the mobile computing platform in order 
to ensure trusted mobile communications and collaboration; integrate trust 
evaluation and management into traditional security technologies; 
 
• Propose and develop a solution of autonomic trust management for the 
component software platform targeting at runtime trust support. 
 
 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
Trust management is an important issue for the mobile computing platforms. This 
dissertation studies methodologies and mechanisms of providing a trustworthy 
computing platform for mobile devices. What is more, we seek solutions to support 
trusted communications and collaboration among those platforms in a distributed 
and dynamic system. The main contributions of each publication are summarized 
below. 
 
• Publication 1 provides a comprehensive review of trust perspective, trust 
modeling, trust evaluation and trust management. Based on the study on the 
state-of-the art, it identifies emerging and future trends. 
 
• Publication 2 presents a conceptual architecture towards establishing a 
trusted mobile environment. The contributions of this paper are a) specifying 
the architecture of a trusted mobile environment; b) developing the 
conceptual architecture and explaining key motivations behind the location of 
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every element in the architecture; and c) evaluating the architecture by 
applying it into a mobile peer-to-peer system. 
 
• Publication 3 introduces a methodology to bridge the domains of trust in 
mobile computing and communications. This methodology benefits the 
system analysis and design for finding trust issues and identifying security 
problems. The concrete approaches for bridging the trust gaps among 
domains instruct how to seek a concrete solution regarding trust management 
for mobile computing platforms.  
 
• Publication 4 presents a mechanism to sustain the trust among computing 
platforms on the basis of the root trust (RT). This mechanism extends the 
trust model from static to dynamic. Thus, it develops the notion of using trust 
management not only for trust assessment but also for trust sustainability. 
The proposed mechanism could be applied in many real applications to 
ensure trusted services and communications. It could work as an extension of 
future TC platform to support various applications with better flexibility. 
 
• Publication 5 introduces a perspective of building up trust collaboration in a 
P2P system based on the TC platform. It is a concrete application of the trust 
sustainability mechanism. Through a uniform TC platform compatible P2P 
device architecture − Trusted Collaboration Infrastructure (TCI), many 
security challenges can be overcome. It is a concrete example of integrating 
both a trust evaluation solution and a pure security solution. In addition, the 
proposed TCI based P2P system can also support automatic network resource 
management as well as privacy. It provides a series of platform mechanisms 
for people to select in order to realize personal protection. Therefore, it 
broadly supports trust collaboration in P2P networks. 
 
• Publication 6 presents another concrete application of the trust sustainability 
mechanism. It illustrates how to apply this mechanism into the context of a 
mobile VPN in order to provide a trusted mobile enterprise solution. This 
solution realizes trust management on mobile enterprise devices at both VPN 
connection and disconnection. 
 
• Publication 7 develops a trust management solution for the dynamically 
changing component software middleware platform based on the trust 
expression using Subjective Logic. It defines a formal trust model to specify, 
evaluate, set up and ensure trust relationships amongst platform entities. 
Based on this trust model, an architecture of autonomic trust management 
can be designed to adopt a number of algorithms to enable the trust 
assessment at runtime and autonomic trust management on the basis of auto-
selection of trust control mechanisms. The trust at the system runtime is 
better addressed with the above emerging properties. 
 
• Publication 8 proposes a methodology for the trust control mode prediction 
and selection aiming at autonomic trust management for a component 
software platform. The simulation results show that this method is effective 
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for predicting and selecting the suitable trust control modes. It also helps 
improving the control mode configurations, especially when there is no 
solution from the prediction. In addition, this method is flexible for 
supporting any system entity’s autonomic trust management. 
 
 
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis consists of several independent, but closely related chapters. 
Chapter 2 presents the work published in Publication 1. We introduce the state-
of-the-art in conceptualizing trust, trust modeling, trust evaluation and trust 
management and identify emerging trends in this area.  
Chapter 3 summarizes the work published in Publication 2 and Publication 3. 
We develop a conceptual architecture based research method and a methodology to 
bridge different domains of trust in order to solve trust related issues in mobile 
computing and communications. This work contributes to the research issue 
described in Section 1.3.1. 
Chapter 4 reports the results published in Publication 4, Publication 5 and 
Publication 6. We proposed a TC platform based mechanism for trust sustainability 
among platforms. This mechanism can be further applied into the P2P systems to 
achieve trust collaboration among peer computing platforms. It can also be used to 
realize trust management in mobile enterprise networking. The work described in 
this Chapter contributes to the research issues described in Section 1.3.2 and 
Section 1.3.3, respectively.  
Chapter 5 reports the results about the autonomic trust management for a 
component software platform. We develop a formal trust model to specify, 
evaluate, set up and ensure trust relationships that exist among platform entities. We 
further present an autonomic trust management architecture that adopts a number of 
algorithms for trust assessment and maintenance during component execution. In 
addition, we propose a methodology for trust control mode prediction and selection 
based on an adaptive trust control model in order to support autonomic trust 
management. The results reported in this Chapter contribute to the research issue 
described in Section 1.3.2. The publications associated with this Chapter are 
Publications 7, Publication 8, [YaP07], [Yan07], [Yan06] and [YaP07a]. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and proposes future work. 
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2 BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
We introduce the state-of-the-art in conceptualizing trust, trust modeling, trust 
evaluation and trust management and identify emerging trends in this area.  
 
 
 
2.1 Factors of Trust 
 
We can find various definitions of trust in the literature [BoH91, Gam90, MDS95, 
GrS02, McC03, McC00, CKW03, Mui03, ALR04, LJT04, Den93, FaC05]. In 
summary, it is widely understood that trust itself is a comprehensive concept, which 
is hard to narrow down. Trust is subjective because the level of trust considered 
sufficient is different for each entity. It is the subjective expectation of the trustor 
on the trustee related to the trustee’s behaviors that could influence the trustor’s 
belief. Trust is also dynamic as it is affected by many factors that are hard to 
monitor. It can further develop and evolve due to good experience about the trustee. 
It is sensitive to be decayed caused by bad experience. More interestingly, from the 
digital system point of view, trust is a kind of assessment on the trustee based on a 
number of trust referents, e.g. competence, security, and reliability, etc.  
 
Trustor’s subjective 
properties
Factors that Influence Trust
Confidence
Belief
Gratification
Disposition
Trustor’s objective 
properties
Goal/Purpose
Regulation
Laws
Standards
Trustee’s subjective 
properties
Benevolence
Motivations
Honesty
Faith
Trustee’s objective 
properties
Security/Safety
Reliability, availability
Integrity
Dependability
Competence
Utility
Predictability
Maintainability
Reputation*
Context
Situation
Risk
Environment
 
 
Figure 2.1: Factors that influence trust 
 
Based on our study, we hold the opinion that trust is influenced by a number of 
factors. Those factors can be classified into five viewpoints, as shown in Figure 2.1: 
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- Trustee’s objective properties, such as trustee’s security and dependability. In 
particular, reputation is a public assessment of the trustee considering its earlier 
behavior. 
- Trustee’s subjective properties, such as trustee’s honesty. 
- Trustor’s subjective properties, such as trustor’s disposition to trust. 
- Trustor’s objective properties, such as the standards or policies specified by the 
trustor for a trust decision. 
- Context that the trust relationship resides in, such as specified situation, risk, etc. 
The context contains any information that can be used to characterize the 
situation of involved entities [Dey01]. 
From the digital system point of view, we pay more attention to the objective 
properties of both the trustor and the trustee. For social human interaction, we 
consider more the trustee’s subjective and objective properties and the trustor’s 
subjective properties. For economic transactions, we study more about the context 
for risk management. The context of trust is a very important factor that influences 
trust. It also specifies the background or situation where trust exists. 
 
 
2.2 Trust Modeling 
 
2.2.1 Characteristics of Trust 
 
Despite the diversity among the existing definitions of trust, and despite that a 
precise definition is missing in the literature, there is a large confluence on what 
properties the concept of trust satisfies. We report here the most significant 
characteristics of trust, which play as the important guidelines for trust modeling.  
a) Trust is directed: trust is an oriented relationship between the trustor and the 
trustee. 
b) Trust is subjective: Trust is inherently a personal opinion. According to 
[GrS00], trust is considered a personal and subjective phenomenon that is 
based on various factors or evidence, and that some of those may carry more 
weight than others.  
c) Trust is context-dependent: In general, trust is a subjective belief about an 
entity in a particular context.  
d) Trust is measurable: Trust values can be used to represent the different degrees 
of trust an entity may have in another. “Trust is measurable” also provides the 
foundation for trust modeling and computational evaluation. 
e) Trust depends on history: This property implies that past experience may 
influence the present level of trust.  
f) Trust is dynamic [GrS00]: Trust is usually non-monotonically changed with 
time. It may be refreshed periodically, may be revoked, and must be able to 
adapt to the changing conditions of the environment in which the trust decision 
was made. Trust is sensitive to many factors, events, or changes of context. In 
order to handle this dynamic property of trust, solutions should take into 
account the notion of learning and reasoning. The dynamic adaptation of the 
trust relationship between two entities requires a sophisticated trust 
management approach. 
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g) Trust is conditionally transferable: Information about trust can be 
transmitted/received along a chain (or network) of recommendations.  
h) Trust can be a composite property: “trust is really a composition of many 
different attributes: reliability, dependability, honesty, truthfulness, security, 
competence, and timeliness, which may have to be considered depending on 
the environment in which trust is being specified” [GrS00]. Compositionality 
is an important feature for making trust calculations. 
 
2.2.2 Trust Models 
 
The method to specify, evaluate, set up and ensure trust relationships among entities 
for calculating trust is referred to as a trust model. Trust modeling is the technical 
approach used to represent trust for the purpose of digital processing. 
A trust model aims to process and/or control trust digitally. Most of the 
modeling work is based on the understanding of trust characteristics and considers 
some factors influencing trust. Current work covers a wide area including 
ubiquitous computing, distributed systems (e.g. P2P systems, ad hoc networks, 
GRID virtual organization), multi-agent systems, web services, e-commerce (e.g. 
Internet services), and component software. For example, trust models can be 
classified into various categories according to different criteria, as shown in Table 
2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Taxonomy of trust models 
 
Classification 
criteria 
Categories Examples 
Models with linguistic description [BFL96] and [TaT98] 
Models with graphic description [ReS98] 
Based on 
modeling 
method Models with mathematic description [XiL04] and [SYH06] 
Single-property modeling [JHK05], [XiL04], and 
[SYH06] 
Based on 
modeled 
contents Multi-property modeling [ZMZ05], [WaV05], 
and [Publication 7] 
Models with binary rating  
Continuous rating [Mau96] and [XiL04] 
Based on the 
expression of 
trust Models with 
numeral 
rating 
Discrete rating [LJT04] 
Models with single dimension [Mau96] and [XiL04] Based on the 
dimension of 
trust expression Models with multiple dimensions [ThB06] and [Jos99]  
 
Although a variety of trust models are available, it is still not well understood 
what fundamental criteria trust models must follow. Without a good answer to this 
question, the design of trust models is still at an empirical stage [SYH06]. Current 
work focuses on concrete solutions in special systems. We would like to advocate 
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that a trust model should reflect the characteristics of trust, consider the factors that 
influence trust, and thus support trust management in a feasible way. 
It is widely accepted that trust is influenced by reputations (i.e. the public 
evidence on the trustee), recommendations (i.e. a group of entities’ evidence on the 
trustee), the trustor’s past experience and context (e.g. situation, risk, time, etc.). 
Most of the work has focused on trust valuation or level calculation without any 
consideration of ensuring or sustaining trust for the fulfillment of an intended 
purpose. We still lack comprehensive discussions with regard to how to 
automatically take an essential action based on the trust value calculated. Except the 
context, all the above items are assessed based on the quality attributes of the 
trustee, the trust standards of the trustor and the context for making a trust or 
distrust conclusion. A number of trust models have considered and supported the 
dynamic nature of trust. So far, some elements of context are considered, such as 
time, context similarity, etc. The time element has been considered in many pieces 
of work, such as [WaV05b, XiL04]. However, no existing work gives a common 
consideration on all factors that influence trust, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
2.3 Trust Management 
 
As defined in [GrS00], trust management is concerned with: collecting the 
information required to make a trust relationship decision; evaluating the criteria 
related to the trust relationship as well as monitoring and re-evaluating existing trust 
relationships; and automating the process. We think that extension of this definition 
is needed in order to manage trust in a computing platform. We will discuss more 
about this in Chapter 5. 
Various trust management systems have been described in the literature. One 
important category is reputation based trust management systems. Trust and 
reputation mechanisms have been proposed in various fields such as distributed 
computing, agent technology, GRID computing, component software, economics 
and evolutionary biology. Examples are FuzzyTrust system [SHZ05], the eBay user 
feedback system (www. ebay.com) [ReZ02], Trustme - a secure and anonymous 
protocol for trust [SiL03], IBM propagation system of distrust [GuK04], PeerTrust 
model developed by Li Xiong and Ling Liu [XiL04], Eigen-Trust algorithm 
[KSG03], TrustWare - a trusted middleware for P2P applications [LiS05], a scheme 
for trust inference in P2P networks [LSB03], a special reputation system to reduce 
the expense of evaluating software components [Her01] and Credence developed at 
Cornell - a robust and decentralized system for evaluating the reputation of files in a 
peer-to-peer file-sharing system [WaS05].  
Reputation-based trust research stands at the crossroads of several distinct 
research communities, most notably computer science, economics, and sociology. 
As defined by Aberer and Despotovic [AbD01], reputation is a measure that is 
derived from direct or indirect knowledge on earlier interactions of entities and is 
used to assess the level of trust an entity puts into another entity. Thus, reputation 
based trust management (or simply reputation system) is a specific approach to trust 
management. Using a reputation system, Alice establishes trust in Bob based on the 
experience that Alice and others have had with Bob. 
Reputation schemes can be classified in two different categories depending on 
what sort of reputation they utilize. Global reputation is the aggregation of all 
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available assessments by other entities that have had interactions with a particular 
entity, and thus it has an n-to-1 relationship. On the other hand, local reputation of 
an entity is each entity's own assessment based on past history of interaction with a 
particular entity, thus it is a 1-to-1 relationship. 
 
 
2.4 Trust Evaluation Mechanisms 
 
Trust evaluation is a technical approach of representing trustworthiness for digital 
processing, in which the factors influencing trust will be evaluated by a continuous 
or discrete real number, referred to as a trust value. Embedding a trust evaluation 
mechanism into trust management is necessary for providing trust intelligence in 
future computing platforms.  
Trust evaluation is the main aspect in the research for the purpose of digitalizing 
trust. A number of theories about trust evaluation can be found in the literature. For 
example, Subjective Logic was introduced by Jøsang [Jos01]. It can be used for 
trust representation, evaluation and update. It has a sound mathematical foundation 
in dealing with evidential beliefs rooted in Shafer’s theory and the inherent ability 
to express uncertainty explicitly. Trust valuation can be calculated as an instance of 
Opinion in Subjective Logic. An entity can collect the opinions about other entities 
both explicitly via a recommendation protocol and implicitly via limited internal 
trust analysis using its own trust base. It is natural that the entity can perform an 
operation in which these individual opinions can be combined into a single opinion 
to allow a relatively objective judgment about other entity’s trustworthiness. It is 
desirable that such a combination operation shall be robust enough to tolerate 
situations where some of the recommenders may be wrong or dishonest. Another 
situation with respect to trust valuation includes combining the opinions of different 
entities on the same entity together using a Bayesian Consensus operation; 
aggregation of an entity’s opinions on two distinct entities with logical AND 
support or with logical OR support. A real description and demo can be found in 
[SL].  
In particular, Subjective Logic is a theory about opinion that can represent trust. 
Its operators mainly support the operations between two opinions. It doesn’t 
consider context support, such as time based decay, interaction times or frequency; 
trust standard support like importance weights of different trust factors. Concretely, 
how to generate opinions on recommendations based on credibility and/or similarity 
and how to overcome attacks on trust evaluation are beyond the theory of SL. These 
need to be further developed in real practice. 
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) could be regarded as a combination of Fuzzy Logic 
and Neural Networks [Kos86]. In a graphical illustration, FCM seems to be a signed 
directed graph with feedback, consisting of nodes and weighted arcs. Nodes of the 
graph stand for the concepts that are used to describe the behavior of the system and 
they are connected by signed and weighted arcs representing the causal relationships 
that exist between the concepts. We will introduce the FCM in details in Chapter 5 
(Section 5.8) before applying it to propose an adaptive trust control model. 
A FCM can be used for evaluating trust. In this case, the concept nodes are 
trustworthiness and the factors that influence trust. The weighted arcs represent 
influencing relationships among those factors and the trustworthiness. The FCM is 
convenient and practical for implementing and integrating trustworthiness and its 
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influencing factors [CFP03]. In addition, some work makes use of the fuzzy logic 
approach to develop an effective and efficient reputation system [SHZ05]. 
Semiring is introduced in [ThB06]. The authors view the trust inference problem 
as a generalized shortest path problem on a weighted directed graph G(V, E) (trust 
graph). The vertices of the graph are the users/entities in the network. A weighted 
edge from vertex i to vertex j corresponds to the opinion that the trustor has about 
the trustee. The weight function is ( ) SVVjil →×:, , where S is the opinion space. 
Each opinion consists of two numbers: the trust value, and the confidence value. 
The former corresponds to the trustor’s estimate of the trustee’s trustworthiness. On 
the other hand, the confidence value corresponds to the accuracy of the trust value 
assignment. Since opinions with a high confidence value are more useful in making 
trust decisions, the confidence value is also referred to as the quality of the opinion. 
The space of opinions can be visualized as a rectangle (ZERO_TRUST, 
MAX_TRUST)× (ZERO_CONF, MAX_CONF) in the Cartesian plane (S = [0, 1] ×  
[0, 1]). Using the theory of semirings, two nodes in an ad hoc network can establish 
an indirect trust relation without previous direct interaction. The semiring 
framework is also flexible to express other trust models. 
Generally, two versions of the trust inference problem can be formalized in an 
ad hoc network scenario. The first is finding the trust-confidence value that a source 
node A should assign to a destination node B, based on the intermediate nodes’ 
trust-confidence values. Viewed as a generalized shortest path problem, it amounts 
to finding the generalized distance between nodes A and B. The second version is 
finding the most trusted path between nodes A and B. That is, find a sequence of 
nodes that has the highest aggregate trust value among all trust paths starting at A 
and ending at B. In the trust case, multiple trust paths are usually utilized to 
compute the trust distance from the source to the destination, since that will 
increase the evidence on which the source bases its final estimate. The first problem 
is addressed with a “distance semiring”, and the second with a “path semiring”. 
They use two operators to combine opinions: One operator (denoted ⊗ ) combines 
opinions along a path, i.e., A’s opinion for B is combined with B’s opinion for C 
into one indirect opinion that A should have for C, based on B’s recommendation. 
The other operator (denoted ⊕ ) combines opinions across paths, i.e., A’s indirect 
opinion for X through path p1 is combined with A’s indirect opinion for X through 
path p2 into one aggregate opinion. Then, these operators can be used in a general 
framework for solving path problems in graphs, provided they satisfy certain 
mathematical properties, i.e., form an algebraic structure called a semiring. 
[SYH06] presents an information theoretic framework to quantitatively measure 
trust and model trust propagation in ad hoc networks. In the proposed framework, 
trust is a measure of uncertainty with its value represented by entropy. The authors 
develop four axioms that address the basic understanding of trust and the rules for 
trust propagation. Based on these axioms two trust models are introduced: entropy- 
based model and probability-based model, which satisfy all the axioms.  
[XiL04] presents five trust parameters used in PeerTrust, namely, feedback a 
peer receives from other peers, the total number of transactions a peer performs, the 
credibility of the feedback sources, a transaction context factor, and a community 
context factor. By formalizing these parameters, a general trust metric is presented. 
It combines these parameters in a coherent scheme. This model can be applied into 
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a decentralized P2P environment. It is effective against dynamic personality of 
peers and malicious behaviors of peers. 
 
 
2.5 Emerging Trends 
 
Herein, we provide insights about emerging trends in trust management. 
 
2.5.1 An Integrated Solution 
 
Theoretically, there are two basic approaches for building up a trust relationship. 
We name them as a ‘soft trust’ solution and a ‘hard trust’ solution [Publication 2]. 
The ‘soft trust’ solution provides trust based on trust evaluation according to 
subjective trust standards, facts from previous experiences and history. The ‘hard 
trust’ solution builds up trust through structural and objective regulations, 
standards, as well as widely accepted rules, mechanisms and sound technologies 
(e.g. PKI and TC platform). Possibly, both approaches are applied in a real system. 
They can cooperate and support with each other to provide a trustworthy system. 
‘Hard trust’ provides a guarantee for the ‘soft trust’ solution to ensure the integrity 
of its functionality. ‘Soft trust’ can provide a guideline to determine which ‘hard 
trust’ mechanisms should be applied and at which moment. It provides intelligence 
for selecting a suitable ‘hard trust’ solution. 
An integrated solution is expected to provide a trust management framework 
that applies both the ‘hard trust’ solution and the ‘soft trust’ solution. This 
framework should support data collection and management for trust evaluation, 
trust standards extraction from the trustor (e.g. a system user), and experience or 
evidence dissemination inside and outside the system, as well as a decision engine 
to provide guidelines for applying different ‘hard trust’ mechanisms for trust 
management purposes. How to design a light-weight and effective trust 
management framework is a practical challenge, especially for the device platforms 
with limited resources. 
In addition, how to store, propagate and collect information for trust evaluation 
and management is seldom considered in the existing work, thus making it an issue 
in real implementation. 
Apart from the above, the question of human-machine interaction with regard to 
trust is an interesting topic that requires special attention. Human-machine 
interaction is crucial to transmit user’s trust standards to the machine and the 
machine needs to provide its assessment of trust to its user and explain it in a 
friendly way. 
 
2.5.2 Autonomic Trust Management 
 
There is a trend that all the processing for trust management is becoming 
autonomic. This trend benefits from the digitalization of trust. Since trust 
relationships are dynamically changed, this requires trust management to be 
context-aware and intelligent to handle the context changes. In addition, the trust 
model itself should be adaptively adjusted in order to match and reflect the real 
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system situation. Context-aware trust management is a developing research topic 
and adaptive trust model optimization could be an emerging research opportunity. 
 
2.5.3 Cross-Domain Benefits 
 
We can estimate that trust management will not only benefit security, but also other 
properties of the system, such as privacy, usability, dependability and Quality of 
Service. Combining trust management with other management technologies (e.g. 
resource management, power management, identity management, risk management 
and fault management, etc.) or applying it into other areas could produce cross-
domain benefits. The outcome system would be more intelligent and provide better 
performance. 
 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
This Chapter introduced former work on trust presented in the literature. We 
summarized the factors influencing trust and the characteristics of trust. Trust 
modeling is actually based on these. Quite a number of research projects on trust 
modeling, evaluation and management have been conducted in the area of 
distributed systems and e-commerce. A more extended survey of the literature is 
provided in Publication 1. A number of recent achievements model trust using a 
mathematical approach. Thus, it is possible to conduct digital trust management for 
the emerging technologies, including mobile computing platforms.  
However, current work mostly focuses on theoretic study. It lacks experience on 
how the proposed approaches work in practice. Most of existing solutions are 
special system driven. They have not considered how to provide a generic solution, 
and thus make trust management benefit not only one specific system, but also 
other digital systems. In addition, current work lacks effort to study human-machine 
or human-platform interaction for the purpose of trust management, which is one of 
the most important issues that require special considerations in practice, especially 
for devices with limitations.  
Regarding the emerging trends, we believe an integrated solution is promising 
and could combine a traditional security solution with newly developed trust 
evaluation based management together. This integrated solution should handle trust 
management in an automatic way and cooperate with other technologies to offer 
better system performance.  
The understanding gained from the literature study instructs our work towards 
solving special issues of trust regarding the mobile computing platform. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES 
 
 
 
We develop a conceptual architecture based research method and a methodology to 
bridge different domains of trust in order to solve trust related issues in mobile 
computing and communications. 
 
 
 
3.1 A Conceptual Architecture Based Research Method 
 
CONCEPT
THEORY
PRACTICE
Trust Model & Standards
APPLICATION
Hard Trust Solution
Trusted mobile enterprise
communication environment
New trusted mobile
networking paradigms
Mobile device with 
trust functionality
Trusted computing platform 
for mobile device with 
trusted code interaction
Soft Trust Solution
Modeling Methodologies
Personal 
Trusted Device
Trusted Mobile
Communication
e.g. ad hoc networks, 
mobile P2P systems
e.g. mobile VPN 
solution with trusted 
device management
e.g. user’s trust authority
in mobile business
e.g. trusted mobile
applications & services
 
 
Figure 3.1: A conceptual architecture of trusted mobile computing 
 
Trust is a very complicated phenomenon attached to multiple disciplines and 
influenced by many subjective and objective factors. Therefore, it is essential to 
define a conceptual architecture to clarify target scenarios, thus narrow down our 
study and make it easy to focus on the concrete issues in different aspects of trusted 
mobile computing. 
We propose an onion structure, as shown in Figure 3.1. It is composed of four 
circles. A concept circle is at the core of the onion. This circle defines a series of 
concepts about trust, its derivatives and its related terms. Based on the working 
concepts, theories and modeling methodologies can be built upon, forming a theory 
circle. Outside the theory circle, there is a practice circle. The practice circle applies 
theories and methodologies into various trust models and standards for supporting 
trust in real applications and systems that form its outer circle: an application circle. 
 
3.1.1 Definitions – Concept Circle 
 
Due to multiplicity of meanings associated with the word 'trust' and its derivatives, 
it is essential to establish a certain set of definitions that can be used throughout one 
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intended purpose. A series of working definitions of trust and its derivatives build 
up the core part of the proposed architecture. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Relationships of concepts 
 
Towards our purpose, we can define a number of concepts, for examples, trust, 
trust modeling, trust model, trusted mobile environment, trusted domain, trusted 
bridge, Trusted Computing platform, Personal Trusted Device, and trust 
relationship. Their relationships are depicted in Figure 3.2. 
 
3.1.2 Theory and Modeling Methodology – Theory Circle 
 
Theoretically, there are two basic approaches for building up a trust relationship: a 
‘soft trust’ solution and a ‘hard trust’ solution, as shown in Figure 3.1.  
There are various ways of trust modeling targeting at different scenarios. Trust 
modeling is crucial for applying trust management approaches into mobile systems. 
Regarding the trust analysis and modeling, we need special methodologies. In order 
to apply a ‘hard trust’ solution, it is essential to analyze default trust relationships 
among system entities and study potential changes of the trust relationships after the 
system initiation. Thereby, trust solutions to overcome trust gaps in the underlying 
system could be designed based on the existing regulations, standards, and widely 
accepted rules and technologies. For the ‘soft trust’ approach, it is important to 
clarify the border of entities or domains among which the trust evaluation is needed. 
Based on timely trust evaluation, decisions could be made to apply appropriate 
mechanisms for ensuring the trust relationship. 
 
3.1.3 Trust Models and Standards – Practice Circle 
 
Based on the theory and methodology established, we can design the trust models 
for mobile applications and systems. Thus corresponding standards can be made in 
industry to support real applications. 
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For example, the trust model of the Trusted Computing (TC) platform as defined 
in [Tcg03] is that the basic trust of every entity is rooted from sound hardware 
security – a ‘hard trust’ solution. Based on this root trust, trust can be further built 
on local OS and application software through authenticated booting. Trust on a 
remote platform can be built based on the attestation of expected platform 
configurations. 
 
3.1.4 Mobile Applications and Systems – Application Circle 
 
This circle considers mobile applications and systems. We divide the application 
circle into four directions, as shown in Figure 3.1. Each direction implies 
motivations for potential business. 
- A trusted mobile computing platform with trusted code interaction: This 
direction aims at providing a TC platform for mobile devices in order to support 
mobile applications and services in a secure and trustworthy way. It also ensures 
trustworthy device internal operation in a dynamically changed context (e.g. the 
middleware component software platform). 
- A mobile device with trust functionalities: This direction tries to provide 
the trust functionalities into mobile devices (e.g. a DRM solution). With the new 
trust features, the devices will become more intelligent in interacting with the users 
and behave as their trust advisors to help them make trust related decisions in 
mobile communications and personal business. With the TC platform support and 
the embedded trust functionalities, the future mobile device could become a 
Personal Trusted Device (PTD) that could be the user’s trust authority for various 
usages. 
- New trusted mobile networking paradigms: This direction aims to support 
new mobile networking paradigms, such as MANETs and mobile P2P systems. 
These new networking paradigms hold special characteristics that introduce new 
challenges to security and trust.  
- A trusted mobile enterprise communication environment: This direction is 
towards building up a trusted environment for mobile working and enterprise 
management, e.g. a mobile Virtual Private Network (VPN) solution with trusted 
device management. With the trusted mobile networking in both public domain and 
enterprise domain, a Trusted Mobile Communication (TMC) environment could be 
supported. 
 
 
3.2 A Methodology to Bridge Different Domains of Trust 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
Trust is such a subjective and dynamic concept that different entities can hold 
different opinions on it even while facing the same situation [Gam90]. Based on 
different trust perception, different trusted domains can be formed in the area of 
mobile computing and communications. For example, a trusted domain that 
contains a security element (such as a smart card) and its issuer is formed if the 
issuer trusts the security element due to its tamper resistance.  
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Taking a mobile computing or communication system as an example, we can 
find many cases in which a system is actually formed by a number of trusted 
domains. Communication is actually conducted among and across those domains. 
Inside each trusted domain, the trust relationships exist among the domain entities. 
But among the domains, a significant problem may arise from the fact that the 
domains deficient of trust must cooperate in order to provide a complete service 
even though they may not share the same concept of trust. Specifically, frequent 
security problems among those domains may be caused by the deficiency of trust 
among domains. This deficiency is probably one of the major barriers that prevent 
the proliferation of mobile computing, communications and services.  
Based on the above analysis, a mobile system can be modeled as consisting of a 
number of trusted domains. Inside a trusted domain, the trust relationship exists. 
While among the domains, trust is lacking, and needs special technologies to build 
up. This trust domain based modeling methodology falls into the theory circle. It is 
also related to the practice circle because a new trust model for a mobile system is 
generated based on the methodology. 
There are several methods to bridge the trust gap among trusted domains, e.g. 
legal, contractual, and risk management based solutions. We believe that 
technology is one of the most important methods. In the following, a technical 
method to bridge the trust gap is provided. We propose a methodology to analyze 
and bridge the trusted domains.  
 
3.2.2 Methodology 
 
In any mobile system, we can always specify the system as a number of trusted 
domains. The communications, transactions or collaboration are actually conducted 
among those domains. Inside each trusted domain, the domain entities trust the 
domain components according to their trust statements, for whatever reasons they 
find appropriate. Among the trusted domains, it is expected that trust must be 
usually created and constructed logically and rationally. We propose a methodology 
to analyze the trust domains and to create the trusted bridge, effectively enabling 
the domains to form a complete solution. A trusted bridge is a component or a set 
of components that is/are trusted by more than one domain. Therefore such 
component(s) can work as a bridge to establish trust or bridge trust gaps among 
those domains. The proposed methodology is summarized as follows. 
1. Model the mobile system by separating it into a number of trusted domains 
formed by different entities. 
2. Analyze each domain in order to extract the trust statements and list existing 
domain components.  
3. For each pair of disjoint domains that must trust each other for the purpose of 
a given intention, seek a bridging solution that can satisfy both domains. 
4. Form the trusted bridge by finding or creating a suitable component (or 
components), or by establishing bridging domains, depending on needs. 
There are several approaches to identify the bridging solution and to introduce 
the trusted bridge, depending on the trust statements within the trusted domains as 
well as on non-technical limitations. A more extended discussion of the approaches 
is provided in Publication 3. Following is a short list of those. 
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a. Use an existing component 
The system analysis itself may lead to the discovery that there is already an 
existing component that may be trusted by more than one domain and thus can 
behave as the trusted bridge.  
b. Create a new component 
If the bridging component does not exist, it is possible to create it. Some 
components may conform to only one trust statement so that they require the 
statement to be identical in both domains. Some components may conform to more 
than one statement so that they can be used to bridge the domains with different 
statements.  
c. Create a separate domain 
If there is no potential component that may satisfy the domains (e.g. the trust 
statements are significantly different), the solution may be to create a separate 
domain such that its domain components fulfill statements from both disjoint 
domains. Such a domain may share existing or new components with all the 
domains it is bridging. We call the created domain a bridging domain. 
 
 
3.3 An Illustration 
 
In this section, we evaluate the conceptual architecture’s expressiveness and 
advantages by applying it into a mobile peer-to-peer system. We also apply the 
methodology described in Section 3.2 to solve the trust deficiency among different 
trusted domains. 
Mobile peer-to-peer computing has emerged as a significant paradigm for 
providing distributed services, in particular collaboration for content sharing and 
distributed computing. Generally, a mobile P2P system consists of a decentralized 
and self-organizing network of autonomous devices that interact as peers. Each peer 
acts as both client and server to share its resources with other peers. However, this 
computing paradigm suffers from several drawbacks that obstruct its wide adoption. 
Lack of trust between peers is one of the most serious issues, which causes security 
challenges in the P2P systems. Building up trust collaboration among the system 
peers is a key issue to overcome. 
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Figure 3.3: Trust model of a mobile peer-to-peer system 
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We presented a Trusted Collaboration Infrastructure (TCI) for a mobile P2P 
system in [Publication 5], which will be described in Chapter 4. This infrastructure 
combines both a ‘soft trust’ solution and a ‘hard trust’ solution in order to support 
the trust collaboration among the mobile peers. We applied the concepts defined in 
the concept circle. By using the modeling methodology introduced in Section 3.2, 
the system can be modeled as a number of trusted domains – trust bubbles. As 
shown in Figure 3.3, each peer device is independently located inside a personal 
trusted bubble: the basic unit that represents a peer. Inside the bubble, the owner of 
the peer device trusts the device based on the TC platform technology. The device 
is responsible for communication with other peers. Among bubbles, logical and 
rational trust relationships should be attested. In order to build up the trust 
collaboration among the bubbles, we applied both a ‘hard trust’ solution and a ‘soft 
trust’ solution.  
The ‘hard trust’ solution uses an improved TC platform technology that can 
ensure the trust sustainability. A trust relationship can be established between a 
trustor device and a trustee device based on the device platform attestation and the 
registration of trust conditions at the trustee device’s TC platform components. 
With the TC platform components inside the peer device, a trustee device can 
ensure trust sustainability according to pre-defined conditions. The conditions are 
approved by both the trustor device and the trustee device at the time of trust 
establishment. They can be further enforced through the use of the pre-attested TC 
platform components at the trustee device until the intended collaboration is 
fulfilled. The TC platform components are built upon a secure hardware chip, 
which is very hard to be broken, even by the trustee itself. This solution falls into 
approach (a) – use existing component: the TC platform component trusted by both 
peer devices, especially after the remote attestation.  
Regarding the ‘soft trust’ solution, the trust evaluation mechanisms embedded in 
each peer device can anticipate potential risks and make the best decision on any 
security related issues in the P2P communications and collaboration. The trust 
evaluation results can help generating feasible conditions for sustaining the trust 
relationship. This mechanism is very helpful in fighting against attacks raised by 
malicious peers that hold a correct platform certificate and valid data for trusted 
platform attestation. This solution falls into approach (b) – create new component: a 
trust evaluation module to support partial trust. 
Through defining the basic concepts and using the modeling methodology, we 
model the system trust and clarify where problems exist. By making use of the 
technologies specified in the theory circle, we can establish trusted mobile 
communications in a mobile P2P system. The presented architecture facilitates our 
work in understanding, analyzing and solving the trust issues. The methodology to 
bridge different domains of trust further helps us to seek the technical solutions for 
trust collaboration among peer devices. 
 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
Trust is playing and will continuously play an important role in the mobile domain. 
In order to support further success of mobile communications, applications and 
services, it is significant to study trust issues for providing a trusted mobile 
computing platform. This platform aims to offer trusted interaction among the 
39 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
mobile computing platforms and their internal components, to support trust 
collaboration among platforms and to provide trust-intelligence to the users of 
mobile devices. 
We presented a conceptual architecture to clarify the structure of trust issues in 
different aspects. Based on this architecture, we can specify a number of key 
motivations. A more extended discussion of these motivations is provided in 
Publication 2. We also introduced a methodology to bridge the domains of trust in 
mobile computing and communications. We proposed that any system analysis and 
design could include modeling the system as composed of different trusted domains 
that may reflect various reasons for trust. Inside the domain, the trust relationships 
have been established, while among domains the trust is deficient. Thus in this way, 
it is easier to identify the trust and security problems hidden inside the system. In 
order to bridge the trust gaps, we proposed three approaches that can be used to 
develop a trust bridging solution. Furthermore, we apply our methodologies into a 
mobile P2P system to demonstrate their applicability, expressiveness and 
advantages.  
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4 TRUSTED COMPUTING PLATFORM BASED SOLUTIONS FOR 
MOBILE COMPUTING 
 
 
 
We proposed a TC platform based mechanism for trust sustainability among 
platforms. In this Chapter, this mechanism is further applied into P2P systems to 
achieve trust collaboration among peer computing platforms. We also show how to 
use the mechanism to realize trust management in mobile enterprise networking. 
 
 
 
4.1 Motivation 
 
With the rapid growth of internetworking and electronic commerce, trust plays a 
crucial role in cyberspace in order to provide various digital services [ChW03]. 
However, establishing a trust relationship in cyberspace is more complicated than in 
the social world. This is because communication in the cyberspace relies not only 
on human beings but also on digital components. Moreover, it is more difficult to 
accumulate accurate information for trust purpose in digital communications than in 
a social context. Generally, it is reasonably easy to initiate trust based on many 
existing technologies and structural regulations, but hard to sustain the trust during 
the fulfilment of a whole service or an intended purpose.  
Trust in digital information society, called digital trust, introduces two major 
challenges. The first one is establishing trust between users and their devices (e.g., 
PC and mobile phone) that is necessary to start the communication. With the 
increasing complexity of device computing platforms and various kinds of software 
running on them, it is very difficult for the users to verify that their devices work 
properly. Trusted computing (TC) platform has been proposed to solve this problem 
[Tcg03, ELM03].  
Another particular challenge is that trust has to be sustained over time. For 
example, trustor A’s trust on trustee B at one moment does not mean A can or will 
trust B at the next moment. The trust relationship built at the beginning of the 
communication should be maintained at least until the service is completed. It is 
essential to monitor and control the trust relationship in order to sustain trust for the 
final success of the service. This Chapter will mainly focus on solving this 
particular challenge that has not been yet properly explored. 
 
 
4.2 Related Work 
 
As introduced in Chapter 2, there is a large range of existing work on trust in 
information technology. The concept of trust is defined in various ways in the 
literature. It is widely understood that the trust itself is a comprehensive concept, 
which is hard to narrow down. It is subjective because the level of trust considered 
sufficient is different for each entity. The trust is also dynamic as it is affected by 
many factors and easily influenced by a bad experience. 
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Many people believe that some metrics should be defined to state various 
degrees of trust [XiL04]. A number of computational trust models were presented 
by different authors in [Man00, LMA02, JoK98, Jos99, Jos01]. These models 
evaluate trust based on the trustor’s direct or indirect experience. However, these 
models only pay attention to the influence of previous knowledge on trust, but 
ignore future changes that may destroy the established trust. Thereby, they lack 
support for cases that demand trust for a longer period of time. 
Also a lot of work has been done on trust management [JoT03, BIK03, GrS03]. 
Trust management systems provide trust assessments based on some trust root, e.g. 
policy assertion and trust specifications. However, they focus on how to evaluate 
trust and have not considered a mechanism to sustain the trust relationship in order 
to support the fulfilment of an intended purpose. 
Another important topic in the literature is Digital Rights Management (DRM) 
[Pas02]. It deals with client-side control of the usage of digital information. The 
trust model of a traditional DRM solution can be described as a reference monitor 
(generally a software application) existing at a user’s system for controlling usage 
of disseminated digital information in lieu of an information issuer. Not only does 
DRM pose significant technical and operational challenges but none of the existing 
DRM solutions considers how to sustain the trust relationship. 
The results presented in this Chapter are highly related to the work on trusted 
computing platforms [Dav02, Vau03, ELM03, BaS03, Fel03]. All work on TC 
platforms is based on hardware security and cryptography for providing a root trust 
(RT) module at a digital computing platform. However, as described in the next 
section, current work on the TC platform still lacks support on trust sustaining over 
the network. This is the key problem that we try to solve. We believe that trust 
management in cyberspace should assure not only trust assessment, but also trust 
sustainability. 
 
 
4.3 Problem Statement 
 
The intention of this section is to clarify one of the problems of the current TC 
platform [Tcg03]. In the TC platform trust is built upon a root trust, which is 
enforced by sound technologies, and realized through secure hardware [Dav02, 
Vau03]. Every time a computer is reset, the root trust module steps in, checks itself, 
and then verifies the OS loader (e.g. BIOS) before letting the boot-up continue. 
Through checking the integrity metrics of different components, the OS loader is 
assumed to verify the operating system, then, the operating system is assumed to 
verify every piece of software, and so on. A remote computing platform can be 
trusted by challenging its integrity metrics, verifying and comparing them with 
expected values that represent components that are trusted enough to perform the 
intended purpose. If compared values match the expected values, trusted interaction 
with the remote computing platform can be commenced. Anomalous metrics 
indicate that the platform is not operating as expected and further communication 
with the platform should be reconsidered. 
However, trust in the remote computing platform neither necessarily remains 
intact for an extended period of time, nor does it remain intact after hardware or 
software configuration changes. Actually, as the trusted computing platform is built 
up during system boot, the root trust module can only verify OS within the 
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previously identified configurations, thus failing to verify trust for any newly added 
hardware or software components. This also means that trust on the remote 
platform cannot be sustained even though the platform could have been trusted at 
some moment. Therefore, one disadvantage of the current TC platform paradigm is 
that it does not provide a dynamic solution and is thus unable to sustain its 
protection in a changeable environment.  
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Figure 4.1: An example of trust in mobile services 
 
In order to illustrate the problem, we take a mobile service as an example. The 
term 'mobile service' can be vaguely defined as a service that is provided to mobile 
users via mobile computing platforms [Publication 3]. Specifically, the mobile 
computing platforms such as mobile phones are considered to be the user agents of 
mobile services. As shown in Figure 4.1, a mobile phone already has the trust 
relationship with its operator through the existence of SIM (Subscriber Identity 
Module) and relevant authentication methods. A mobile Service Provider (SP) stays 
out of the usual trust relationship. Based on the TC platform technology, it is 
possible for both the mobile SP server and the mobile computing platform to verify 
each other as trusted computing platforms at the beginning of the service. However, 
as time passes, the SP server cannot guarantee that trust is sustained since hardware 
or malicious software can be installed in the mobile computing platform. 
One simple solution is to periodically re-challenge the remote platform. This 
however requires frequent communications between the remote platform and the 
server, which are neither feasible nor economical in the mobile environment. 
Further, the remote device bears the burden of frequent and unnecessary 
computationally-intensive operations. Still, this method may be subject to some 
forms of the man-in--middle attacks [HaD05].  
 
 
4.4 A Mechanism for Trust Sustainability among Platforms 
 
In order to overcome the above problem, we introduce a mechanism for sustaining 
trust among computing platforms. We first present a trust formula used in the 
mechanism, and then the RT module on which the mechanism is based.  
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4.4.1 Trust Form 
 
The proposed mechanism uses the following trust formula: “Trustor A trusts trustee 
B for purpose P under condition C based on root trust R”. The difference between 
this formula and others is in the element C - conditions to trust. The element C is 
defined by A to identify the rules for sustaining the trust for purpose P, the 
conditions and methods to get signal of distrust behaviours, as well as the 
mechanism to restrict any changes at B that may influence the trust relationship. 
The root trust R is the foundation of A’s trust on B and its sustainability. Since A 
trusts B based on R, it is rational for A to sustain its trust on B based on R 
controlled by the conditions decided by A. The R is an existing component trusted 
by entities located at different domains of trust. Thus, it can be used for bridging 
trust deficiency for building up a long term trust relationship among the computing 
platforms. This formula makes it possible to extend one-moment trust over a longer 
period of time. 
 
4.4.2 Root Trust Module 
 
The proposed mechanism is based on a root trust (RT) module that is also the basis 
of the TC platform. The RT module could be an independent module embedded in 
the computing platform. It could also be a build-in feature in the current TC 
platform’s Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and related software [Vau03]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Root trust module 
 
The RT module at the trustee is most possibly a hardware-based security 
module. It has capability to register, protect and manage the conditions for trust 
sustaining and self-regulating. It can also monitor any computing platform’s change 
including any alteration or operation on hardware, software and their 
configurations. The RT module is responsible for checking changes and restricting 
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them based on the trust conditions, as well as notifying the trustor accordingly. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the basic structure of this module. 
There are two ways to know the platform changes. One is an active method, that 
is, the platform hardware and software notify the RT module about any changes for 
confirmation. The other way is a passive method, that is, the RT module monitors 
the changes at the hardware and the software. At the booting time, the RT module 
registers the hash codes of each part of platform hardware and software. It also 
periodically calculates their run-time values and checks if they are the same as 
those registered. If there is any change, the RT module will check with the 
registered trust conditions and decide which measure should be taken. 
The RT module can be designed and implemented inside a secure main chip of 
the mobile computing platform. The secure main chip provides a secure 
environment to offer security services for the operating system (OS) and software 
applications and some security enforcement mechanisms (e.g. system integrity 
booting and device identity) [PaL]. It also provides cryptographic functions and a 
secure storage. The RT module functionalities are implemented by a number of 
protected applications. The protected applications are small applications dedicated 
to performing security critical operations inside the secure environment. They have 
strict size limitations and more resemble function libraries. The protected 
applications can access any resources in the secure environment. They can also 
communicate with normal applications in order to offer security services. New 
protected applications can be added to the system at any time. The secure 
environment software controls loading and execution of the protected applications. 
Only the signed protected applications are allowed to run. 
 
4.4.3 Mechanism for Trust Sustainability 
 
As postulated, the trust relationship is controlled through the conditions defined by 
the trustor, which are executed by the RT module at the trustee on which the trustor 
is willing to depend. The reasons for the trustor to depend on the RT module at the 
trustee can be various. Herein, we assume that the RT module at the trustee can be 
verified by the trustor as its expectation for some intended purpose and cannot be 
compromised by the trustee or other malicious entities later on. This assumption is 
based on the work done in industry and in academy [Dav02, Vau03, ELM03, 
BaS03].  
As shown in Figure 4.3, the proposed mechanism comprises the following 
procedures. 
a) Root trust challenge and attestation to ensure the trustor’s basic trust 
dependence at the trustee in steps 1- 2;  
b) Trust establishment by specifying the trust conditions and registering them at 
the trustee’s RT module for trust sustainability in steps 3-6;  
c) Sustaining the trust relationship through the monitor and control of the RT 
module in steps 7-8; 
d) Re-challenge the trust relationship if necessary when any changes against 
trust conditions are reported.  
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Figure 4.3: Protocol for trust sustainability 
 
As we can see in the above protocol, trust is based on the trustor’s dependence 
on the RT module. Although the RT module is located at the trustee, its execution 
for trust maintenance and sustainability is based on the agreed conditions and rules 
approved by both the trustee and trustor at the time trust is established. 
Notably, step 8.2 is an option, which is applied based on the negotiation of the 
trust relationship establishment. If the requirement of distrust notification is not 
presented in the trust relationship conditions, the step 8.2 will not be applied. If 
there is such a requirement, corresponding technologies or mechanisms for 
information protection should be further clarified by the trustor and be agreed by 
both the trustor and the trustee in the step 5 and 6. We can make use of public key 
encryption or secret key encryption to protect the notification. We can also use 
some existing protocol (e.g. SKIP) to implement the step 8.2. 
In order to defend against the attacks raised by information capturing and 
destroying, the trustee can wait for the trustor’s response after it sends the 
notification. If there is no response within an expected period, the trustee can take 
corresponding measures, which are specified in the trust relationship conditions and 
approved by both the trustor and the trustee at the trust relationship establishment. 
Trust is a subjective concept. Based on the conditions, the trustor has reasons to 
sustain its trust on the trustee until the fulfillment of the intended purpose. The 
corresponding measures specified in the trust relationship conditions for any 
distrust situation and any abnormal situation are thought as trusted by the trustor. 
Optionally, the trust conditions could be certified through a Trusted Third Party 
(TTP). The trustor can send its private policies to the TTP. The TTP combines the 
private policies and general policies together in order to generate the conditions 
tailored for the trustor. It then issues the certified conditions to the trustor. Typical 
example conditions are “the integrity of the platform is not changed” and 
“additional software can be installed only if it is certified by a specified trusted 
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authority”. The trust conditions can be described using XML (eXtensible Markup 
Language). A detailed design is provided in [YaC03]. 
Taking a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) as an example, it is possible to 
ensure the trustworthy communications among a number of nodes for an intended 
purpose (e.g. routing from a source node to a destination) by imposing identical 
trust conditions (e.g. the integrity of the platform is not changed and extra software 
applications are restricted to install) in the node computing platforms. At the 
beginning, the initial trust relationships are established based on the Root Trust 
module challenge and attestation between each communication node pairs. If the 
trust attestation fails, the trust relationship can not be built up. After the initial trust 
relationships have been established, the RT module can ensure the trust 
relationships based on the requirements specified in the trust conditions. 
Particularly, if the RT module detects any malicious behavior or software at the 
trustee device, it will reject or block it. If the RT module finds that the node 
platform is attacked, the trustor node platform could be notified. In addition, a trust 
evaluation mechanism can be embedded into the RT module or its protected 
components in the node computing platform in order to evaluate other nodes’ 
trustworthiness based on experience statistics, the reputation of the evaluated node, 
node policies, an intruded node list and transformed data value. Any decision 
related to security (e.g. a secure route selection) should be based on trust analysis 
and evaluation among network nodes. Detailed discussion about this ‘soft trust’ 
solution is provided in [YZV03]. In particular, the trust evaluation results can 
greatly help in designing suitable trust conditions for trust sustainability during 
node communications. It could also help in selecting the most trustworthy node in 
the ad hoc networking. 
In the following two sections, we will present two use cases and illustrate how 
this mechanism benefits solving trust issues in P2P systems and mobile enterprise 
networking, respectively. 
 
 
4.5 Trust Collaboration in P2P Systems 
 
Peer-to-peer computing has emerged as a significant paradigm for providing 
distributed services, in particular collaboration for content sharing and distributed 
computing. However, this computing paradigm suffers from several drawbacks that 
obstruct its wide adoption. Lack of trust between peers is one of the most serious 
issues, which causes a number of security challenges in P2P systems. Publication 5 
studies the feasibility of building up trust collaboration in the P2P systems based on 
the mechanism introduced in Section 4.4. We introduce a Trusted Collaboration 
Infrastructure (TCI) for peer-to-peer computing devices. Through applying the TCI, 
trust collaboration can be established among distributed peers through the control of 
the TC platform components. Based on analysis, we conclude that the TC platform 
technology is a promising solution that can overcome many P2P security challenges 
and thus realize trust collaboration among P2P peers. 
 
4.5.1 Trusted Collaboration Infrastructure (TCI) for P2P 
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Based on the trust model presented in Section 3.3, we further propose a trusted 
collaboration infrastructure (TCI) for the P2P system. In this infrastructure, each 
peer device is TC platform compatible and has an internal architecture as shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
There are three layers in this architecture. A platform layer contains TC platform 
components specified in [Tcg03] (e.g. TPM) and an operating system that is booted 
and executed in a trusted status, which is attested and ensured by the TC platform 
components. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Architecture of P2P peer device in TCI 
 
A P2P system layer contains common components required for trusted P2P 
communications. Those components are installed over the platform layer and 
ensured running in a trusted status. This is realized through trusted component 
installation and alteration-detection mechanism supported by the platform layer. A 
communication manager is responsible for various P2P communications (e.g., the 
communications needed for the P2P system joining and leaving). A trust evaluation 
module is applied to evaluate the trust relationship with any other peer before any 
security related decision is made. The trust evaluation module cooperates with a 
policy manager and an event manager in order to work out a proper trust evaluation 
result. The policy manager registers various local device policies regarding P2P 
applications and services. It also maintains subjective policies for trust evaluation. 
The event manager handles different P2P events and cooperates with the trust 
evaluation module in order to conduct proper processing. 
A P2P application/service layer contains components for P2P services. Taking 
resource sharing as an example, this layer should contain components such as a 
resource-search manager, a resource-offer manager and a resource-relocation 
manager. The resource-search manager is responsible for searching demanded 
resources in the P2P system. The resource-offer manager provides shared resources 
according to their copyright and usage rights. The offered resources could be 
encapsulated through the encryption service of the TC platform. The encryption 
offered by the encryption service is attached to some special configurations as 
mandatory requirements for decryption. The resource-relocation manager handles 
remote resource accessing and downloading. The downloaded resources are firstly 
checked with no potential risk, and then stored at the local device. 
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Like the system layer, all the components in this layer are attested by the 
platform layer (e.g. trusted OS) as trusted for execution. Any malicious change 
could be detected and rejected by the platform layer. 
 
4.5.2 Trust Collaboration 
 
Trust collaboration is defined as interaction; communication and cooperation are 
conducted according to the expectation of involved entities. For example, the 
shared contents in the P2P systems should be consumed and used following the 
content originator’s or right-holder’s expectation without violating any copyrights. 
In peer-to-peer systems, the trust collaboration requires autonomous control on 
resources at any peer. The trust collaboration in the proposed P2P system 
infrastructure fulfills the following trust properties. 
 
- Each peer device can verify that another peer device is working in its expected 
status. 
Building up on the TC platform technology, each peer device with the 
underlying architecture can ensure that every component on the device is working 
in a trusted status. It can also challenge any other device and attest that it is working 
in its expected status, as shown in Figure 4.5 (step 1 and 2). This is done through 
digitally certifying the device configurations.  
Two levels of certifying are provided. One is certifying the OS configuration. 
On this level, the system uses a private key only known by the RT module to sign a 
certificate that contains the configuration information, together with a random 
challenge value provided by a challenger peer device. The challenger provided that 
it generates the random challenge value can verify that the certificate is valid and 
up-to-date, so it can know what the device’s OS configuration is. 
In many cases, there is a strong desire to certify the presence and configuration 
of application programs. Application configurations are certified through a two-
layer process. The RT module certifies that a known OS version is running and then 
the OS can certify the applications’ precise configuration. 
 
- Trust relationship established at the beginning of the collaboration between peers 
can be sustained until the collaboration is fulfilled for some intended purpose based 
on trust conditions. 
As shown in Figure 4.5, the trust relationship can be established between a 
trustor device and a trustee device based on the trust platform attestation (step 1-2) 
and the registration of trust conditions at the trustee device’s TC platform 
components, e.g. the RT module (step 3-4). Through applying the mechanism 
described in Section 4.4, a trustee device can ensure the trust sustainability 
according to pre-defined conditions (step 5-6). The conditions are approved by both 
the trustor device and the trustee device at the time of trust establishment. They can 
be further enforced through the use of the pre-attested TC platform components at 
the trustee device until the intended collaboration is fulfilled. 
One example of the trust conditions is shown in Figure 4.6. The example trust 
conditions specify that a) upgrading of P2P applications is only allowed for the 
‘TrustIssuer’ certified applications; b) the changes for any hardware components in 
the computing platform is disallowed; and c) any changes for the rest of software in 
the computing platform are disallowed. All of above conditions can be ensured 
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through integrity check by the Root Trust module based trusted computing 
components and secure software installation mechanism that can verify the 
certificate of a software application before the installation.  
 
Figure 4.5: Trust collaboration in P2P system 
 
 
Figure 4.6: An example of trust conditions for trust collaboration in P2P system 
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Through applying this mechanism, there are ways to automatically control the 
remote environment as trusted. Optionally, it is also possible to inform the trustor 
peer about any distrust behavior of the trustee according to pre-defined conditions 
(step 7). Therefore, it is feasible for the trustor peer to take corresponding measures 
to confront any changes that may affect the continuation of trust for the purpose of 
a successful P2P service. 
 
- Each peer can manage the trust relationship with other peers and therefore it can 
make the best decision on security issues in order to reduce potential risks. 
Based on the trust evaluation mechanisms [YZV03, FDK02, KSP01, Jos01, 
Kos86, JIB05, LVW04] embedded in the trust evaluation module, each peer can 
anticipate potential risks and make the best decision on any security related issues 
in the P2P communications and collaboration. The trust evaluation results can help 
generating feasible conditions for sustaining the trust relationship. In particular, the 
trust evaluation is conducted in the expected trust environment, thus the evaluation 
results are generated through protected processing. This mechanism is very helpful 
in fighting against attacks raised by malicious peers that hold a correct platform 
certificate and valid data for trusted platform attestation. 
 
- Resources are offered under expected policies. 
This includes two aspects. One is that the resources are provided based on 
copyright restrictions. Those contents that cannot be shared should not be disclosed 
to other peers. The other is that the resources are provided with some limitations 
defined by the provider. The encryption services offered by the TC platform can 
cooperate with the resource-offer manager to provide protected resources and 
ensure copyrights and usage rights. Regarding the encryption services, refer to 
[Publication 5]. 
 
- Resources are relocated safely and consumed as the provider expects.  
The trust attestation mechanism offered by the TC platform can support the 
resource-relocation manager to attest that the downloaded contents are not 
malicious code. In addition, the resources are used in an expected way, which is 
specified according to either copyrights or pre-defined usage restrictions. This can 
be ensured by the TC platform encryption mechanism before and during content 
consuming. 
 
- Personal information of each peer is accessed under expected control. 
The resource-offer manager in the proposed architecture can cooperate with the 
TC platform components to encapsulate the personal information based on the 
policies managed by the policy manager. Only trusted resource-search manager can 
access it. The trusted resource-search manager is an expected P2P application 
component that can process the encapsulated personal information according to the 
pre-defined requirements specified by the personal information owner. 
With the TC platform components in the TCI, any P2P device component can 
only execute as expected and process resources in the expected ways. Furthermore, 
with the support of trust evaluation and trust sustainability, the peers could 
collaborate in the most trustworthy way. 
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4.5.3 Deployment 
 
The TCI is a device based infrastructure. One essential requirement for deploying 
the TCI is that the device is TC platform compatible. Once the TCI is deployed in 
every P2P system device or part of the system devices, it can automatically support 
the system trust collaboration through the components and mechanisms provided by 
the TCI. 
Due to the above reason, the TCI can be flexibly integrated into any distributed 
system, such as a peer-to-peer system or a Grid computing system. It can support 
peer based or node based trust collaboration in a dynamically changed decentralized 
system. For different purposes, different components can be downloaded and 
installed at the application / service layer. The preferred software middleware 
platform for the TCI could be component-based software architecture that interfaces 
with the TC platform functionalities and provides necessary mechanisms to support 
components’ execution in a trustworthy way. We will further discuss how to ensure 
a trustworthy component software platform in Chapter 5. 
More promisingly, the P2P paradigm will be a valuable extension of current 
enterprise networking, especially for a mobile enterprise networking. The TCI can 
also be applied for enterprise device management in a P2P scenario. It can protect 
confidential resources from being accessed by unauthorized peers. In addition, it 
ensures the enterprise peer device to behave as expected in a P2P networking even 
though it is disconnected with the enterprise network. This is the result of 
[Publication 6] and will be presented in Section 4.6. 
 
4.5.4 Remarks 
 
TC platform technologies are under development in the industry and academy in 
order to provide more secure and better trust support for future digital devices. The 
TC platform tries to solve existing security problems by hardware trust. Although it 
is still in its infancy and may be vulnerable to some hardware attacks [Hua02], it 
has advantages over many software-based solutions.  
We introduced a perspective of building up trust collaboration in a P2P system 
based on the TC Platform, which is discussed in a more extended way in 
Publication 5. Through a uniform TC platform compatible P2P device architecture 
− TCI, many security challenges can be overcome. In addition, the proposed TCI 
based P2P system can also support automatic network resource management as well 
as privacy. It provides a series of platform mechanisms for people to select for the 
purpose of personal protection. Therefore, it can support trust collaboration in the 
P2P systems that lack trust. It has potential advantages over other solutions; 
especially when the TCG standard is deployed and many industry digital device 
vendors (e.g. Microsoft, IBM, HP, Intel, etc.) will offer compatible hardware and 
software in the future. 
 
 
4.6 Trust Management in Mobile Enterprise Networking 
 
How to manage trust in mobile enterprise networking among various mobile 
devices is problematic for companies using mobile enterprise solutions. This 
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section presents a trust management system in an enterprise virtual private network 
(VPN) also based on the mechanism for trust sustainability.  
 
4.6.1 Problem Statement 
 
Trust plays a key role in the context of virtual private networking (VPN). However, 
providing advanced trust into VPN networks has proven to be problematic in 
mobile domains. This is mainly caused by two reasons. 
First, current VPN networks lack the means to enable trust among mobile 
computing platforms from different manufactures. For example, an application can 
be trusted by Manufacture A’s devices but may not be recognized by Manufacture 
B’s devices. Moreover, from a VPN management point of view, it is difficult to 
manage the security of a large number of computing platforms. This problem is 
more serious in mobile security markets. Since different mobile device vendors 
provide different security solutions, it is difficult or impossible for mobile 
enterprise operators to manage the security of diverse devices in order to 
successfully run security-related services. 
Second, no existing VPN system ensures that the data or components on a 
remote user device can only be controlled according to the enterprise VPN 
operator’s security requirements, especially during VPN connection and 
disconnection. The VPN server is unaware as to whether the user device platform 
can be trusted or not although user verification is successful. Especially, after the 
connection is established, the device could be compromised, which could open a 
door for attacks. Particularly, data accessed and downloaded from the VPN can be 
further copied and forwarded to other devices after the VPN connection has been 
terminated. The VPN client user could conduct illegal operations using various 
ways, e.g. disk copy of confidential files and sending emails to other people. 
Nowadays, the VPN operators depend on the loyalty of the VPN client users to 
address this potential security problem. In addition, a malicious application or a 
thief that stole the device could also try to compromise the integrity of the device. 
Regarding the problems described above, no good solutions could be found in 
the literature. Related work did not consider the solutions of the problems described 
above [Her99, WSC88, Reg03, ChM02]. For example, a trust management solution 
based on KeyNote for IPSec in [BIK02] could ensure trust during VPN connection 
in the network-layer. A security policy transmission model was presented to solve 
security policy conflicts for large-scale VPN in [SLW03]. But the proposal could 
not help in solving the trust sustainability after the VPN connection and 
disconnection. Past work focused on securing network connection, not paying much 
attention to the necessity to control VPN terminal devices [HAM05]. In addition, 
security or trust policy of the VPN operator should be different regarding different 
VPN client devices, which raises additional requirements for trust management in 
enterprise networking. 
The following sections present a trust management system based on a virtual 
private network in order to enhance trust in mobile enterprise networking. Our 
focus will be on how to support confidential content management and how to 
overcome the diversity support of security in different devices manufactured by 
different vendors. The discussion is based on the mechanism for trust sustainability 
among computing platforms. We illustrate how to apply this mechanism into 
mobile virtual private networks. 
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4.6.2 Trust Management in Mobile VPN  
 
We provide a solution for enhancing trust in a mobile VPN system. In this case, a 
VPN trust management server is the trustor, while a VPN client device is the 
trustee. A trust relationship could be established between them. The VPN trust 
management server identifies the client device and specifies the trust conditions for 
that type of device at the VPN connection. Thereby, the VPN client device could 
behave as the VPN operator expects. Additional trust conditions could be also 
embedded into the client device in order to control VPN-originated resources (e.g. 
software components or digital information originated from the VPN). Therefore, 
those resources could be managed later on as the VPN operator expects even if the 
device’s connection with the VPN is terminated. Even though the VPN client 
device is not RT module based, the trust management server can identify it and 
apply corresponding trust policies in order to restrict its access to confidential 
information and operations. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: An example of trust conditions for trust management in a mobile 
enterprise networking 
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A simple example of trust conditions for trust management in a mobile 
enterprise networking is illustrated in Figure 4.7. The example trust conditions 
specify that a) printing and forwarding files achieved from the enterprise Intranet 
are disallowed when the device disconnects the Intranet; b) the changes for any 
hardware components in the computing platform are disallowed; and c) the changes 
by the device owner for any software in the computing platform are disallowed, too. 
All of above conditions can be ensured through the Root Trust module based 
trusted computing technology. 
 
System structure 
 
The proposed mobile VPN system comprises a plurality of client devices, gateways 
and servers, part or all of which are RT module based platforms. The system 
provides the management of RT based platforms in the network, and enables 
verification among the platforms.  
Figure 4.8 illustrates the proposed mobile VPN system used in mobile networks 
(e.g., GSM networks). In the figure, the mobile VPN users use their mobile devices 
to connect to their enterprise VPN and access VPN services (e.g., emails, file 
sharing, etc.). The mobile devices connect to the Internet through some wireless 
access technology (e.g., WLAN). The VPN trust management server manages the 
trust policies for the mobile devices. Notably, the server may reside inside the VPN 
or in the Internet (protected by a firewall). It instructs how the mobile devices can 
use their RT module and for what operations. Meanwhile, the server is able to 
push/pull the trust conditions to the mobile devices in a secure, fast and convenient 
way (e.g., through SSL). With the help of the server, the mobile devices can more 
securely and easily set up trust relationships with other trusted entities including 
other client devices and VPN network devices. Therefore, they are able to easily set 
up and maintain the trust relationships during VPN operations and even beforehand 
and afterwards.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Mobile VPN system structure 
 
In particular, with the trust conditions received from the trust management 
server, the RT module with other necessary modules (e.g., secure storage) in the 
mobile device is able to keep and maintain the trust relationship, e.g., allow or 
refuse to install a software, etc. 
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Although we only mention one trust management server, the server itself may 
consist of a number of servers that make the system working in practice. For 
example, a PKI server that generates certificates for the mobile client devices can 
be included into the system if needed. 
 
System functions 
 
The proposed system provides four major functions. Firstly, the system provides for 
a trust management server that manages the RT information (e.g., certificates) of 
various computing platforms in the network. The trust management server stores 
the RT information of the platforms in a local storage and is able to provide the RT 
information of any platform to other platforms upon requests. It also maintains the 
trust conditions on different platforms according to the security policies applied by 
the VPN operator. Those trust conditions are attached to the RT information of 
different devices and indicate the expected conditions that the device platform has 
to fulfill for trust establishment and management. The trust conditions can be 
configured at the trust management server in order to ensure and maintain the trust 
relationships with different vendor devices. In addition, the trust management 
server collects distrust notifications/warnings from the client devices and decides 
whether to terminate the VPN connection of the client device. 
Secondly, the RT module based platform of the system is able to request the RT 
information and the trust conditions of local platforms or remote platforms from the 
trust management server. In requesting the RT information, the platform is also able 
to challenge and verify the remote platforms. By applying the trust conditions into 
the RT module, the challenging platform can ensure that the remote platform will 
work as expected according to the VPN operator’s specifications. 
Thirdly, the RT module based platform is able to manage the trustworthiness of 
the platform all the time, e.g., verifying codes when the codes are installed and 
loaded, and verifying the RT module of remote platforms before/during 
communication. The platforms in the system also ensure that the VPN client device 
platform is the VPN operator trusted platform for the duration of the VPN 
connection. It restricts the distrusted changes of the device hardware and software 
according to the VPN’s connection requirements (i.e. trust conditions); therefore, a 
trusted VPN connection is ensured throughout the entirety of the connection. 
Fourthly, with the RT module, more security related services can be provided. 
For example, in order to prevent crucial data (e.g. confidential files saved locally 
from the VPN) from being accessed in the VPN disconnection status, the usage of 
the data can be controlled by the RT module. This aspect is especially significant in 
that the employees of a company can safely use their company devices, in which 
company confidential data is stored, in an extranet environment (e.g., the Internet) 
without the potential for disclosing the crucial data to network hackers. Without this 
level of protection, the company devices are vulnerable to hackers via the Internet. 
They are also vulnerable to malicious applications and employees without loyalty. 
In general, the system proposes a trust management solution in a mobile 
enterprise VPN context. The system aims to manage trust-related operations among 
devices in the enterprise network so that building up trust across devices and 
between different components of a device (e.g., between applications and OS) is 
possible. In particular, the system ensures the execution of local platforms and 
remote device platforms as VPN operator’s expectation by applying the trust 
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conditions into those platforms and maintaining the trust relationship through the 
RT module control. Therefore, the system solves the existing problems in a mobile 
enterprise VPN context. In addition, the system offers an advanced control on 
confidential data on the basis of the RT module after the VPN connection is 
terminated. Therefore, it offers enhanced trust with better security for an enterprise 
VPN and increases the user’s confidence in VPN services. 
 
Implementation 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: An example implementation for getting trust conditions 
 
Trust management of the proposed VPN system is driven by trust conditions issued 
by the trust management server and sent to the VPN client devices. Figure 4.9 
illustrates an example implementation through which a mobile device with the RT 
module can get the trust conditions from the trust management server. The 
conditions are embedded into the device for trust management purpose. The 
implementation consists of the following steps. 
1. A mobile device connects (or accesses via WAP) to a local access point. 
2. The local access point forwards the connection request to the VPN trust 
management server. The device may also be able to connect to the trust 
management server directly without passing through the access point. 
3. The trust management server challenges the device over a secure channel 
(e.g., SSL) for authentication. Also, the device may require information from 
the trust management server for server authentication. Once the 
authentication succeeds, the device sends its information to the server upon 
request. The device information may include a platform configuration 
certificate, and the mobile device unique platform ID. 
4. The trust management server verifies that the above documents can be 
trusted. 
5. Then, the trust management server issues all kinds of files to the device. The 
files may include, for example, connection configurations, trust conditions 
for the underlying VPN connection and disconnection, trust conditions on the 
device for local networking (e.g. P2P enterprise networking), and trust 
conditions for the contents originated from the enterprise resources. 
6. The device can use these files to connect to the intranet services. It also 
registers the conditions into its RT module based platform for trust 
management in the context of mobile VPN. 
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4.6.3 Remarks 
 
By deploying the mechanism for trust sustainability among computing platforms, a 
VPN system can be managed according to the enterprise operator’s expectation. 
With the proposed system, problems that retard the deployment of mobile enterprise 
networking can be solved. No matter connected or disconnected, the mobile devices 
behave as trusted due to the RT module control. In addition, various devices with 
different security solutions could work together under unified management of the 
trust management server. A more extended discussion of the issues is provided in 
Publication 6. 
 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
This Chapter presented a mechanism for sustaining trust among computing 
platforms on the basis of Root Trust. The formula of trust used takes the form “A 
trusts B for P under C based on R”. The formula creates trust based on the 
attestation of the RT module at the trustee and controls its sustainability according 
to the pre-defined conditions C. Those conditions are approved by both the trustor 
and the trustee at the time of trust establishment and enforced through the use of the 
pre-attested RT module until the intended purpose is fulfilled.  
This work extends the trust model from static to dynamic. Thus, it develops the 
notion of using trust management not only for trust assessment but also for trust 
sustainability. The proposed mechanism could be applied in many real applications 
for trusted services and communications, for example, trust collaboration in P2P 
systems and trust management in mobile enterprise networking. It could work as an 
extension of the trusted computing platform to support various applications with 
enhanced flexibility. 
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5 AUTONOMIC TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR A COMPONENT 
SOFTWARE PLATFORM 
 
 
 
In this Chapter, we discuss autonomic trust management for a component software 
platform. We develop a formal trust model to specify, evaluate, set up and ensure 
trust relationships that exist among platform entities. We further present an 
autonomic trust management architecture that adopts a number of algorithms for 
trust assessment and maintenance during component execution. In addition, we 
propose a mechanism for trust control mode prediction and selection on the basis of 
an adaptive trust control model in order to support autonomic trust management. 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The growing importance of software in the domain of mobile systems introduces 
special requirements on trust due to the nature of applications they provide. In 
particular, this applies when the software is component based and varies due to 
components joining and leaving the system. However, the lack of a trustworthy 
software platform could be the main reason that retards the further development of 
mobile applications and services. 
From a system point of view, trust is the assessment of a trustor on how well the 
observed behavior (quality attributes) of a trustee meets the trustor’s own standards 
for an intended purpose [Den93]. From this, the critical characteristics of trust can 
be summarized, it is: subjective, different for each individual in a certain situation; 
and dynamic, sensitive to change due to the influence of many factors. Obviously, it 
does not suffice to require the trustor (e.g. most possibly a digital system user) to 
make a lot of trust related decisions because that would destroy any attempt at user 
friendliness. For example, the user may not be informed enough to make sound 
decisions. Thus, establishing trust is quite a complex task with many optional 
actions to take. Rather trust should be managed automatically following a high level 
policy established by the trustor, for example a software component or the user of a 
component software platform. We call such trust management autonomic. 
Autonomic trust management automatically processes evidence collection, trust 
evaluation, and trust (re-)establishment and control. We need a proper mechanism 
to support autonomic trust management not only on trust establishment, but also on 
trust sustaining. This is important for a component software platform that should 
support trustworthy downloading and executing of the software components. 
A number of studies on trusted computing and management have been 
conducted in the industry and reported in the literature. For example, TCG (Trusted 
Computing Group) aims to build up a trusted computing device on the basis of a 
secure hardware chip [Tcg03, Vau03, Dav02, ELM03, BaS03]. Some trust 
management systems focus on protocols for establishing trust in a particular 
context, generally related to security requirements. Others make use of a trust 
policy language to allow the trustor to specify the criteria for a trustee to be 
considered trustworthy [GrS00]. However, the focus on the security aspect of trust 
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tends to assume that the other non-functional requirements [BMM05], such as 
availability and reliability, have already been addressed. 
Recently, many mechanisms and methodologies are developed for supporting 
trusted communications and collaborations among computing nodes in a distributed 
system (e.g. an Ad Hoc Network, a P2P system and a GRID computing system) 
[ZWW05, ThB06, LVW04, SYH06]. These methodologies are based on digital 
modeling of trust for trust evaluation and management. We found that these 
methods are not very feasible for supporting trust on a device software platform. 
At present, there is no common framework to enable trust management in a 
commercial component software system (CSS), even though there is a pressing 
need to support a range of new applications. This framework must support 
autonomic trust management through trust assessment and maintenance over the 
dynamic component software system, consisting of different functionalities 
provided by various disparate companies. We need technologies for the 
development and validation of trusted systems based on the integration of multi-
party software while at the same time reducing the cost and integration time. 
Meanwhile, we argue that trust can be controlled according to its evaluation result. 
Special control modes can be applied into the software platform in order to ensure a 
trustworthy system. A trust control mode contains a number of control mechanisms 
or operations, e.g. encryption, authentication, hash code based integrity check, 
access control mechanisms, duplication of process, and a man-in-middle solution 
for improving availability, etc. It can be treated as a special configuration of trust 
management that can be provided by the system.  
The work presented in this Chapter is conducted in EU ITEA Trust4All project 
[RST]. This project aims to build up a trustworthy middleware architecture in order 
to support easy and late integration of software from multiple suppliers and still 
have dependable and secure operation of the resulting system. 
 
 
5.2 Related Work 
 
Trust has been recognized as an important factor for component software. A 
number of interesting solutions have been proposed to ensure its trustworthiness 
[Her01, Her03, ZMZ05, ZJM05, HaR06].  
Herrmann developed a special reputation system based on a component user’s 
experience, other users’ experiences and the third trusted party’s certificate in order 
to reduce the expense of evaluating components [Her01, Her03]. His work is one of 
the first to study trust management for component software. He is the first, as what 
we know, to apply runtime observation based method to collect valuable 
information for trust evaluation on a software component. In [Her01], he applied an 
approach which takes the experience of other users with a component and employed 
the concept of trust management to calculate trust values from good and bad 
evaluations with it. Particularly, a trust information service was introduced to 
collect expertise and make it available to component users and certification 
authorities. The expertise is gained from certification of a component as well as 
monitoring it during deployment. From these evaluations a trust value is generated 
and offered to parties interested to purchase the component. The runtime 
monitoring was implemented by a secure wrapper. It is a piece of code extending a 
component, while the wrapper does not change the behavior of the component. It 
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monitors the component interface for security flaws. In addition, the intensity of the 
runtime observations about a component can be adjusted due to the current trust 
value of the component. In some urgent distrust situation, the security wrapper 
can aid to seal the component. In [Her03], Herrmann further extended his work 
to prevent that a component user sends wrong reports resulting in a bad trust value 
of the component by discounting a recommendation with the trust value in the 
recommender. The total trust value of a particular component is calculated by 
application of Jøsang’s Subjective Logic [JoK98, Jos01].  
Our work reported in this Chapter focuses on component execution time trust 
management. We aim to conduct runtime holistic trust management in a component 
software platform based on the system's competence in an autonomic way. We 
apply a centralized trust management framework to conduct runtime observation 
based autonomic trust management in order to release the development burden that 
is needed per each component and support interoperability. The trust assessment is 
based on observing a number of quality attributes of the trustee entity for the 
purpose of adaptively recognizing the real system’s situation to conduct autonomic 
trust management. This observation is conducted by the trust management 
framework embedded in the component software runtime layer. It is a system 
centralized observation solution, not a secure wrapper based distributed solution. 
The total trust value is calculated by aggregating the values of different quality 
attributes together according to the preference set by the trustor entity. The trust 
value expression and generation is also based on the Subjective Logic [JoK98, 
Jos01], while the total trust value aggregation is implemented by applying a new 
operator. The autonomic trust management is implemented through control mode 
prediction and selection mechanisms on the basis of an adaptive trust control model 
with the consideration of trust control mechanisms’ influence on trust.  
A framework for dynamic re-configuration of different qualities from the view 
of trust was constructed in [ZMZ05, ZJM05] providing common mechanisms in 
middleware to ease the burden for trust component developers. Comparing with 
previous works, it focused on a trust perspective to satisfy various QoS demands of 
different users, and built a five-layer trust management framework, which not only 
provides common trust management facilities for trust components, but also 
supplies components for dynamical (re-)configuration of multi-properties. Based on 
the framework, the authors presented an algorithm to adjust dynamically all the 
involved trust properties according to predefined policies when the environment 
changes. The solution proposed in [ZMZ05, ZJM05] supports multiple properties 
of trust. The centralized trust management in middleware is similar to our solution, 
but with different design since our design supports auto-selection of trust control 
mechanisms. Also, the trust evaluation function in [ZMZ05, ZJM05] relies on 
users to customize. It is usually time-consuming and prone to errors. Some 
automation functions are needed in the trust management framework to reduce 
more the burdens of developers. Regarding the dynamic reconfiguration of 
component trust properties, it lacks necessary support to evaluate if trust can be 
managed based on the system’s competence. The adjustment based on predefined 
policies lacks flexibility and can not predict cross-influence of various trust 
mechanisms on different trust properties. In this Chapter, we propose a trust 
assessment based autonomic trust management solution in order to overcome the 
above problems and further release the burden of component software developers. 
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The on-going TrustSoft project aims to study a holistic approach to software 
trustworthiness through certifying multiple quality attributes of the software 
[HaR06]. The methodology of trust management applied in this project is different 
from the solution presented in this Chapter. 
 
 
5.3 Trust Issues in Component Software 
 
Due to dynamic changes in the component software system and due to multiple 
vendors that may offer software components with similar functionalities, we need to 
develop trust management mechanisms for the component software system. For the 
component-centered aspect we must consider trust at several decision points: at 
download time and during execution. At a component download time, we need to 
consider whether a software provider can be trusted to offer a component. 
Furthermore, we need to predict whether the component is trustworthy for 
installation. More necessarily, when the component is executed, we have to ensure 
that it can cooperate well with other components and the system provides expected 
performance and quality. The trust relationship changes during the above 
procedure.  
When discussing a component software platform, the execution of components 
in relation to other entities of the system needs to be taken into account. Even 
though the component is trustworthy in isolation, the new joined component could 
cause problems because it will share system resources with others. This influence 
will impact the trustworthiness of the system. Consequently, the system needs 
mechanisms to control its performance, and to ensure its trustworthiness in an 
autonomic way even if the internal and external environments change. Additionally, 
some applications (e.g. a health care service) need special support for trust because 
they have high priority requirements, whereas game playing applications, while 
exhibiting similar functionality (e.g. a network connection) will not have the same 
priority. Therefore, system-level trustworthiness is dependent on the application 
domain, so the system needs a trust management framework that supports different 
trust requirements from the same or different components. This Chapter presents 
autonomic trust management for a component software platform mainly focusing 
on system runtime and embedded intelligence to predict and select control modes 
for supporting autonomic trust management. 
 
 
5.4 Requirements and Approaches to Autonomic Trust Management 
 
From the component software platform point of view, autonomic trust management 
includes the following four aspects. 
- Trust establishment: the process for predicting trustworthiness and establishing a 
trust relationship between a trustor and a trustee. Trust establishment is required 
when a component or a bundle of components is downloaded and installed at the 
system. It is also required when a new component starts to run. 
- Trust monitoring: the trustor or its delegate monitors the performance of the 
trustee. The monitoring process aims to collect useful evidence for trust 
assessment. 
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- Trust assessment: the process for evaluating the trustworthiness of the trustee by 
the trustor or its delegate. The trustor assesses the current trust relationship and 
decides if this relationship should be changed or not. If it is changed, the trustor 
will make a decision which measure should be taken. 
- Trust control and re-establishment: if the trust relationship will be broken or is 
broken, the trustor will find reasons and take corresponding measures to control 
or re-establish the trust relationship. 
A number of requirements can be summarized in order to support autonomic 
trust management for a component software platform. Firstly, the platform should 
handle the requests with different trust priority adaptively. This can be solved by a 
system architecture design supporting collaboration between the trust management 
framework and the resource management framework through component trust 
modeling. Secondly, for trust crash, the device should react adaptively as expected 
within some limited time. Trust assessment based evaluation on selected control 
modes can be applied to solve this issue. Finally, the platform should be intelligent 
for trust management. “Which trust control mechanism is good for improving 
which quality attributes in what kind of context” should be well addressed. The 
effectiveness of trust control modes should be predicted for the selection and 
deployment of the best modes.  
Particularly, a component software platform is composed of a number of 
entities, e.g. a component (composition of components), an application, a sub-
system and the whole platform system. The trustworthiness of an entity depends on 
a number of Quality Attributes (QAs) of the entity. The quality attributes can be the 
entity’s trust properties (e.g. security, availability and reliability) and/or 
recommendations or reputations with regard to them. The taxonomy of Quality 
Attributes is shown in Figure 5.1. We mainly aim to support security and 
dependability ensured trustworthiness.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Taxonomy of quality attributes 
 
The QA is reflected by some matrices, the parameters of the matrices can be 
monitored. Thus the QA can be evaluated at system runtime. For example, the 
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availability of a system entity can be reflected by this entity’s response time and 
uptime percentage. The decision or assessment of trust is conducted based on the 
trustor’s (e.g. a component consumer) subjective criteria and the trustee entity’s 
quality attributes, as well as influenced by context information. The context 
includes any information that can be used to characterize the situation of the 
involved entities. The quality attributes of the entity can be controlled or improved 
via applying a number of trust control modes. Thus, special control modes can 
ensure the trustworthiness of the system entity, especially at component download 
time and runtime. The relationships of those factors related to platform trust are 
illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Factors related to platform trust 
 
Based on the above understanding, we propose a procedure to conduct 
autonomic trust management in the component software platform targeting at a 
trustee entity specified by a trustor entity, as shown in Figure 5.3.  
Trust control mode prediction is a mechanism to anticipate the performance or 
feasibility of applying some control modes before taking a concrete action. It 
predicts the trust value supposed that some control modes are applied before the 
decision to initiate those modes is made. Trust control mode selection is a 
mechanism to select the most suitable trust control modes based on the prediction 
results. 
For a trustor, the trustworthiness of its specified trustee can be predicted 
regarding various control modes supported by the system. The control mode can be 
treated as a special configuration of trust management that can be provided by the 
system. Based on the prediction results, a suitable set of control modes could be 
selected to establish the trust relationship between the trustor and the trustee. 
Further, a runtime trust assessment mechanism is triggered to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of the trustee through monitoring its behavior based on the 
instruction of the trustor’s criteria. According to the runtime trust assessment results 
in the underlying context, the system conducts trust control model adjustment in 
order to reflect the real system situation if the assessed trustworthiness value is 
below an expected threshold (refer to Section 5.8). This threshold is generally set 
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by the trustor to express its real expectation on the assessment. Then, the system 
repeats the procedure. The context-aware or situation-aware adaptability of the trust 
control model is crucial to re-select suitable control modes in order to fulfill 
autonomic trust management.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Autonomic trust management procedure at runtime 
 
In order to implement the above approach, we need firstly to develop a trust 
model that can specify, evaluate, set up and ensure the trust relationships among 
system entities. In addition, a trust management architecture is required to adopt a 
number of algorithms that can realize the approach. These algorithms should be 
developed based on the trust model and include trust prediction for component 
software execution, trust assessment at runtime, control mode prediction and 
selection and adaptive trust control model adjustment. In the following sections, we 
will discuss the above issues in details. 
 
 
5.5 A Formal Trust Model  
 
In this section, we present a formal trust model that can support autonomic trust 
management. It contains a sub-model to present trust relationships among system 
entities, a sub-model to specify the information related to trust management for a 
software component, a sub-model for trust assessment and a sub-model for trust 
management.  
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A component software system can be represented as a structure ),,( MRE , where 
E  represents the set of the system entities, R  the set of trust relationships between 
the entities, M  the set of trust management mechanisms for the management of 
such trust relationships. 
The system entities can be any parties that are involved in or related to the 
component software system or platform. These entities include a platform/system 
user, a component consumer, a component provider, a service, a component 
(composition of components), an application, a sub-system and a system, as well as 
an operation or a mechanism provided by the system. 
An application is a software entity that provides a set of functions to a user. A 
component is a unit of trading that may contain multiple services. A service is a unit 
of software instantiation that is contained in a component and conforms to a 
component model. A system is a combination of a platform, a set of components, a 
runtime environment (RE) and a set of applications that can provide a user with a 
set of functions. The platform provides access to the underlying hardware. The 
relationships among the above entities are described in Figure 5.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Relationships of component software system entities 
 
A model of trust relationship (TR) 
 
A trust relationship between two entities in the component software system can be 
specified as a 6-tuple ( ){ }udbopevctpytetrTR ,,,,,,,=  which asserts that entity tr 
trusts entity te with regard to tr’s trust policy py in the context ct, based on the 
evidences about te: ev, which is collected from the experience of the trustor (e.g. 
trustor’s experiences about a number of quality attributes) and/or the experiences 
collected from other entities (e.g. recommenders) [Her03, XiL04, JHK05], and 
op(b,d,u) indicates the trust valuation. It is the probabilities of opinion on te 
regarding belief (b), disbelief (d) and uncertainty (u) [JoK98, Jos01]. Particularly, b, 
d, and u satisfy: 1=++ udb , and 1,,0 ≤≤ udb . Herein, belief means the probability 
that the entity te can be trusted by the entity tr; disbelief means the probability that 
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te can not be trusted by tr; and uncertainty fills the void in the absence of both 
belief and disbelief. It is important to note that the trust value can be expressed in 
other forms, e.g. a single-dimension value, depending on the method used for the 
trust value calculation. 
Variable py represents a subset of the set ( PY ) of all policies regarding trust 
management. { }crepirtoPY ,,,= , where to is a threshold opinion for trust, 
{ }
nqaqaqaqa iririririr _3_2_1_ ,...,,,=  is the importance rates of different quality attributes qa 
of the te, and ep is the policy about the evidence used for the trust assessment. 
Variable cr ( { }
nqaqaqaqa tvtvtvtvcr _3_2_1_ ,...,,,= ) is the criteria for setting positive points 
iqap _  or negative points iqan _  on different quality attributes (refer to Section 5.7 for 
details). It specifies the trusted values or value scopes of different factors reflecting 
the quality attributes of the trustee. 
 
A model of software component (CTM) 
 
A component trust model can be described as { }rulreqpertlconresoprCTM ,,,),,(,= , 
where OPRopr ∈ , the set of all operations provided by the component services. 
This model describes the trust specifications of all the operations implemented by 
the services in the component. The trust request level (tl) indicates the importance 
of the operation (opr). res and con specify the resource (res) consumption 
requirements (con) that the operation required in order to provide the performance 
described by per. Particularly, res ∈  {memory, cpu, bus, net,…}. Variable per 
represents a subset of the set ( { }),(
_ iqai tvqaPER = ) of all possible quality attributes 
regarding the underlying operation and the promised trusted value scopes. Variable 
req specifies the requirements for cooperating with other services, e.g. the trust 
policy to call a service. In addition, composition rules (rul) are criteria for 
composing this model with other component trust models.  
The component trust models are attached to the software component. They can 
be composed based on the composition rules. They have several usages. At 
download time, they can be used to help the system to predict whether a component 
may have some trust influence on the system, e.g. whether the required resources 
may exceed the system’s competence. At execution time, they are used by the 
system to predict trustworthiness of a number of cooperated components and 
arrange resources for the services, especially when the resources are limited. A 
more detailed discussion of the issues is provided in [Yan07]. In addition, the 
component trust models could help the system trust management framework to 
predict trustworthiness and monitor the performance of the services (e.g. the 
composed performance per could play as the default trust criteria for trust 
assessment at runtime), thus evaluate if the component’s services and the subsystem 
containing the component are trusted or not. The assessment result plays as a trigger 
for autonomic trust management, especially trust control and enforcement. In 
addition, the component trust model could also be used to reason about problems of 
some services in a component.  
 
A model of trust assessment (TA) and a model of trust management (ATM) 
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The trust assessment can be expressed as a 6-tuple ),,,,,( CTMpyevcttetrTA = , which 
asserts that tr evaluates te’s trust in the context ct, based on the tr’s policy py, and 
according to evidence ev and the component trust model CTM. The output of trust 
assessment is a set of opinions on trustworthiness and a number of quality 
attributes. Trust management can be expressed as a 3-tuple ),,( MTATRATM = , 
which asserts that mechanisms M are applied for the trust relationship TR according 
to the trust assessment TA. In Section 5.8, we propose an adaptive trust control 
model that is a concrete implementation of ATM with a number of algorithms’ 
support. 
The trust management mechanisms compose a set { }
came
TTTTM ,,,= , where 
e
T  is 
the set of mechanisms used for trust establishment and re-establishment, e.g. a 
component container to isolate a distrusted component from its environment; 
m
T  is 
the set of mechanisms applied for monitoring and collecting the evidences or the 
factors regarding the quality attributes of the trustee, e.g. a dynamically initiated 
monitor instantiation at the trust management framework to report a component 
service’s runtime performance; 
a
T  is the set of mechanisms for trust evaluation, e.g. 
a runtime trust assessment mechanism and a trust prediction mechanism for 
component software download and execution regarding system competence and 
component cooperation [Yan07]; and 
c
T  is the set of mechanisms for controlling 
trust in order to sustain the trust relationship, e.g. encryption, authentication, hash 
code based integrity check, access control mechanisms, duplication of process, 
reconfiguration of component linkage, man-in-middle solution for improving 
availability, etc. The mechanisms in 
e
T  and 
c
T  are classified in terms of different 
quality attributes. Thus the system knows which mechanism should be considered 
in order to ensure or support a quality attribute. 
 
Relationships of models 
 
The above introduced sub-models can cooperate with each other to support solving 
the trust issues related to component software. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Relationships among four sub-models 
 
At the component download time, the sub-model of software component (CTM) 
is used to predict if the component is trustworthy for downloading based on system 
resource and reliability analysis [Yan07]. TA can also be applied to study the 
reputation of a software component, (e.g. [Her01, Her03]) for component 
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procurement. We think the above two levels of evaluations should be supported by 
the system and conducted based on the trustor’s preference. During the component 
execution, CTM can be applied to check system resource and reliability before 
dynamically linking a number of components together [Yan07]. Additionally, we 
make use of TA to conduct trust assessment based on runtime observation on the 
behaviour of the trustee entity (e.g. a software component) with regard to the CTM 
of the component and the trustor’s policy. Different from the prior arts, the 
assessment results further trigger autonomic trust management based on the sub-
model of trust management (ATM) in order to ensure and sustain the trust 
relationship. In particular, TR and CTM can be used to compare trust relationships 
for auto-configuring a set of components that could cooperate with each other in 
order to provide expected services. The relationships of these four sub-models are 
depicted in Figure 5.5. 
 
 
5.6 Trust Management Architecture 
 
5.6.1 Platform Structure 
 
The mobile computing platform generally consists of a layered architecture with 
three layers: an application layer that provides features to the user; a component-
based middleware layer that provides functionality to applications; and, the 
fundamental platform layer that provides access to lower-level hardware. Using 
components to construct the middleware layer divides this layer into two sub-
layers: a component sub-layer that contains a number of executable components 
and a runtime environment (RE) sub-layer that supports component development. 
Placing trust management inside this architecture means linking the trust 
management framework with other frameworks responsible for component 
management (including download), security management, system management and 
resource management. Figure 5.6 describes interactions among different functional-
blocks inside the RE sub-layer. The trust management framework is responsible for 
the assessment of trust relationships and trust management operations, system 
monitoring and autonomic trust managing. The download framework requests the 
trust framework for trust assessment of a component to decide whether to download 
the component and which kind of mechanisms should be applied to this component. 
When a component service needs cooperation with other components’ services, the 
execution framework will be involved, but the execution framework will firstly 
request the trust management framework for decision. The system framework takes 
care of system configurations related to the components. The trust management 
framework is located at the core of the runtime environment sub-layer. It monitors 
the system performance and instructs the resource framework to assign suitable 
resources to different processes. This allows the trust management framework to 
shutdown any misbehaving component, and to gather evidence on the 
trustworthiness of a system entity. Similarly, the trust management framework 
controls the security framework, to ensure that it applies the necessary security 
mechanisms to maintain a trusted system. So briefly, the trust management 
framework acts like a critical system manager, ensuring that the system conforms to 
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its trust policies. This architecture ensures the implementation of both the ‘hard 
trust’ solution and the ‘soft trust’ solution. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Relationships among trust management framework and other 
frameworks 
 
5.6.2 Trust Management Framework 
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Figure 5.7: The structure of trust management framework 
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Figure 5.7 illustrates the structure of the trust management framework. In Figure 
5.7, the trust manager is responsible for trust assessment and trust related decision-
making, it closely collaborates with the security framework to offer security related 
management. The trust manager is composed of a number of functional blocks. The 
trust policy base saves the trust policy (py) regarding making trust assessments and 
decisions. The recommendation base saves various recommendations. The 
experience base saves the evidence ev collected from the component software 
platform itself in various contexts. The decision/reason engine is used to make trust 
decision by requests from other frameworks (e.g. the download framework and the 
execution framework). It combines information from the experience base, the 
recommendation base and the policy base to conduct the trust assessment. It is also 
used to identify the reasons of trust problems. The mechanism base registers a 
number of mechanisms in 
e
T  and 
c
T  for trust control and establishment that are 
supported by the platform. It is also used to store the trust control models as 
described in Section 5.8. The selection engine is used to select suitable mechanisms 
to ensure the platform’s trustworthiness in a special context. It also conducts 
adaptive adjustments on the trust control model. 
In addition, the recommendation input is the interface for collecting 
recommendations. The policy input is the interface for the system entities to input 
their policies. The trust mechanism register is the interface to register trust 
mechanisms that can be applied in the system. The quality attributes monitor is the 
functional block used to monitor the system entities’ performance regarding those 
attributes that may influence trust. The trust manager cooperates with other 
frameworks to manage the trustworthiness in the whole system. 
 
 
5.7 Trust Assessment at Runtime  
 
The main functionality provided by the decision/reason engine is the trust 
assessment. There are several existing mechanisms that can be applied for assessing 
trust through evidence. Here subjective logic (SL) [Jos01] has been chosen as the 
formal base for trust assessment because of its sound mathematical foundation in 
dealing with evidential beliefs; and the inherent ability to express uncertainty 
explicitly. The SL consists of a belief model called opinion and a set of operations 
for aggregating opinions. Herein, we apply a simplified scheme of the SL as in 
[JoK98, LVW04, Twi03]. 
 
5.7.1 Notations and Definitions 
 
We develop and use several new SL operators to illustrate how to assess trust based 
on the formal trust model in the trust management framework. 
 
Notation 1: 
1. An opinion Ω∈= ),,( udbω , where 1=++ udb , and [ ]1,0,, ∈udb . b is the 
belief, d is the disbelief, u is the uncertainty of the opinion and Ω is the set of 
all opinions. In particular, iω  is the opinion on the quality attribute iqa , and 
Aω  is an opinion about a proposition A; 
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2. QA  is the set of quality attributes qa that may influence an entity’s opinion 
on a proposition; 
3. W  is the set of weights w of different opinions, such that iw  is the 
importance rate of iω  on the quality attribute iqa , or iw  is the weight of 
opinion iο  on an entity, where Ο∈ο  – the set of opinions on an entity. In 
particular, [ ]1,0∈iw  and ∑ = 1iw ; 
4. )(xop  is an opinion on x, ).( yxop  is an opinion on the quality attribute y of x; 
5. x.y.z is the value of parameter z of y in x; e.g. iqatvcrpy _.. : parameter iqatv _  of 
cr  in py . 
 
Definition 1.  
Let 
a
Ω  be the set of opinions, W  their weights w and Ω⊂Ω
a
, such that 
a
udb Ω∈= ),,(ω . 
Then Ω→Ω××Ω×Σ )()(:
aa
WW  is the weighted summation operator on opinions 
and for a finite set of n opinions, ( )∑∑∑∑ = udb ,,ω  is the summary opinion such that 
∑=
=
∑
n
i
iibwb
1
; ∑=
=
∑
n
i
iidwd
1
; ∑=
=
∑
n
i
iiuwu
1
. 
 
The weighted summation operator can be used to combine the opinions on a 
number of the trustee’s quality attributes. The combination is based on the 
importance rates of the attributes. It also makes it easy to consider other influencing 
factors of trust through weighting, such as time element, similarity of 
recommendations to trustor’s own experience and similarity of different contexts, 
etc. It is also flexible to support applying other forms of trust value expression. 
The weighted summation operator can be applied to a finite set of m opinions 
Ο∈ο  on an entity with weights w∈W. Then ),,( ∑∑∑∑ = udbο , where ∑
=
∑ =
m
i
iibwb
1
; 
∑
=
∑ =
m
i
iidwd
1
; ∑
=
∑ =
m
i
iiuwu
1
. 
The weighted summation operator can also be used to aggregate the opinions 
about a trustee generated by different entities or by the same entity at different 
times. The combination is also based on weights. 
Notably, the operator ∑  sits beyond the original theory of the SL. It supports a 
special case that all iω  hold the same base rate a  (the default value is 0.5) [Jos01]. 
In addition, based on experimental study, it can provide similar results to the results 
through applying the SL original operators ( ){ }0,1,
1 iii
m
i
ww −⊗⊕
=
ω . That is using the 
Discounting operator ⊗  to weight iω  with discounting opinion )0,1,( ii ww − , and 
then applying Bayesian Consensus operator ⊕  to aggregate all discounted iω  
together [TLU06]. Thereby, the operator ∑  provides a shortcut for the aggregation 
of trust values expressed as SL opinions. 
 
Definition 2.  
Let ( )udb ,,=ω . 
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Then ωθ →),,(: rnp  is the opinion generator, such that 1=++ udb , 
( )rnppb ++= / , ( )rnpnd ++= /  , and ( )rnpru ++= / .  
Particularly, p is the positive points of evidence on a proposition, n is the negative 
points of evidence on the proposition, 1≥r  is a parameter controlling the rate of 
loss of uncertainty, which can be used to tune the use of uncertainty in the model 
for the requirements of different scenarios (we often take 2=r ).  
 
The operator θ  is used to generate an opinion based on positive and negative 
evidence [JoK98]. Note that other definitions on calculating b, d and u can also be 
applied. 
 
Definition 3.  
Given two opinions ),,( AAAA udb=ω  and ),,( BBBB udb=ω , we define the comparison 
operator 
op≥  as an opinion comparison operator, whereby BopA ωω ≥  holds, if 
BABABA uuddbb <<> ;; . And we say that opinion ),,( AAAA udb=ω  is over a threshold 
presented by ),,( BBBB udb=ω . 
 
The operator 
op≥  is used to compare two opinions, especially to decide if an 
opinion is over a threshold presented by another opinion and order a number of 
opinions [LVW04]. Note that 
op≥  is a partial order operator. 
 
5.7.2 Trust Assessment Algorithm 
 
At runtime, the quality attribute monitor monitors the trustee’s performance with 
respect to its quality attributes. The monitoring is based on or driven by the criteria 
or policies set by the trustor entity who registers itself firstly at the trust 
management framework in order to manage trust of its specified trustee. Monitoring 
based method for trust (re-)evaluation was defined in the concept of trust 
management by Grandison and Sloman [GrS00]. A runtime observation based 
method through applying a security wrapper to simulate a component contract 
situation for collecting useful information for trust evaluation on the software 
component was proposed in [Her01]. In the experience base, for each quality 
attribute, if the monitored performance is better than the criteria (saved in the policy 
base), the positive points of that attribute are increased by 1. If the monitored result 
is worse than the criteria, the negative points of that attribute are increased by 1. 
The opinion of each quality attribute can be generated based on the opinion 
generator θ  [JoK98]. In addition, based on the importance rates of different quality 
attributes, a combined opinion on the trustee can be calculated by applying the 
weighted summation operator. By comparing to the trust threshold opinion (to), the 
decision engine can decide if the trustee is still trusted or not. The algorithm for 
trust assessment at runtime is described below. 
Initialization 
te: the assessed target (a system or subsystem or a service) 
py(to, ir, ep, cr): the policy on te: 
0
__
== iqaiqa pn ; 2_ =iqar ; ),...,1( ni =  
op(te.qa_i) = (0,0,1); op(te) = (0,0,1) 
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1. Monitor te’s performance regarding te’s quality attributes in 
specified period t. 
2. For ),...,1(_ niiqa =∀ ,  
 If the monitored result is better than iqatvcrpy _.. , ++iqap _ ; 
 Else, ++iqan _  
3. For ),...,1(_ niiqa =∀ , calculate the opinion: 
),,()_.(
___ iqaiqaiqa rnpiqateop θ= . 
4. Based on the importance rates on different attributes, calculate 
the combined opinion: { }∑=
=
n
i
iqa iqateopirteop
1
_
)_.(,)( . 
5. If topyteop
op .)( ≥ , make trust decision; else, make distrust 
decision. 
 
The assessment is conducted based on a time window or monitoring times, 
which can be specified by the trustor. This algorithm has been tested, implemented 
and integrated into the EU ITEA Trust4All platform as one of the mechanisms for 
trust assessment on the platform entities. The Trust4All platform is a Linux based 
middleware platform for component software.  
There are a number of operators provided by the SL to conduct operations on the 
SL opinions. Herein, we use the newly defined weighted summation operator. 
There are several reasons. Firstly, we can not find any existing SL operator that can 
directly support aggregating a number of opinions on one entity’s quality attributes 
together. Secondly, as specified above, the weighted summation operator is a 
shortcut operation of applying the SL original operators. That is using the 
Discounting operator ⊗  to weight iω  with discounting opinion )0,1,( ii ww − , and 
then applying Bayesian Consensus operator ⊕  to aggregate all discounted iω  
together [TLU06]. Thirdly, using the weighted summation operator could make the 
trust assessment autonomic. The weights or important rates can be automatically 
generated based on the high level policies of the trustor, for example, time distance 
or the deviation of context similarity and opinion similarity. Finally, using the 
weighted summation operator is compatible with the trust control model as will be 
introduced in Section 5.8. Thereby, the trust assessment at runtime introduced 
herein can cooperate with the trust control mode prediction and selection as well as 
adaptive trust control model adjustment in order to provide an autonomic trust 
management solution.  
 
5.7.3 General Criteria Support 
 
In the proposed formal trust model, we support the criteria for setting positive 
points iqap _  or negative points iqan _  on different quality attributes. Particularly, it is 
also possible to support general criteria that specify the conditions of trust related to 
several quality attributes. The trust opinions calculated based on the general criteria 
can also be aggregated based on the importance rates. 
In addition, a tracing factor (tf) can be introduced to support a special case that 
when the opinion on a trust influencing factor (e.g. a quality attribute) is below 
some threshold, trust will be totally lost. We set 0=tf  if it happens. The final trust 
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value will be tailored as ( )fffff udb ,,ωω = , where 0=∗= ∑ tfbb f , ∑∑ += dbd f , 
Σ= uu f . If trust is partially lost in this case, 10 << tf , and tfbb f ∗= ∑ , 
∑∑ +−= dtfbd f )1( , Σ= uu f . 
 
 
5.8 Adaptive Trust Control Modeling and Control Mode Selection 
 
For autonomic trust management of a component software platform, the trust 
control mode prediction and selection are important functionalities with regard to 
the automatic processing of trust. In this section, we firstly introduce the Fuzzy 
Cognitive Map that plays as the foundation of the adaptive trust control model 
proposed in Section 5.8.2. Then we present the algorithms used for control mode 
prediction and selection, and context-aware adaptive model adjustment. We also 
report our simulation results published in [YaP07] followed by further discussion 
on a number of issues related to the flexibility and effectiveness of the model. 
 
5.8.1 Fuzzy Cognitive Map 
 
A Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) could be regarded as a combination of Fuzzy Logic 
and Neural Networks. In a graphical illustration, FCM is a signed directed graph 
with feedback, consisting of nodes and weighted arcs. Nodes of the graph stand for 
the concepts that are used to describe the behavior of the system and they are 
connected by signed and weighted arcs representing the causal relationships that 
exist between the concepts, as shown in Figure 5.8. It must be mentioned that all the 
values in the graph are fuzzy, so concepts take values in the range between [0, 1] 
and the weights of the arcs are in the interval [-1, 1]. The FCM makes clear the 
interconnections and influences between concepts, It also permits updating in the 
construction of the graph, such as the adding or deleting of an interconnection or a 
concept [SGG]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: A simple Fuzzy Cognitive Map 
 
A Fuzzy Cognitive Map consists of nodes-concepts and arcs between concepts. 
Each concept represents a characteristic of the system; in general it stands for 
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events, actions, goals, values, trends of the system that is modeled as an FCM. Each 
concept is characterized by a number Ai that represents its value and it results from 
the transformation of the real value of the system’s variable, for which this concept 
stands. 
Between concepts, there are three possible types of causal relationships that 
express the type of influence from one concept to the others. The weights of the 
arcs between concept Ci and concept Cj could be positive (Wij > 0) which means 
that an increase in the value of concept Ci leads to the increase of the value of 
concept Cj , and a decrease in the value of concept Ci leads to the decrease of the 
value of concept Cj. Or there is negative causality (Wij < 0) which means that an 
increase in the value of concept Ci leads to the decrease of the value of concept Cj 
and vice versa. Or there is no causality (Wij = 0) which means that an increase or 
decrease in the value of concept Ci has no any influence on the value of concept Cj 
In addition to the graphical form of the FCM there is its algebraic representation. 
It consists of a n×1  state vector A which includes the values of the n concepts and 
an nn×  weight matrix W which gathers the weights Wij of the interconnections 
between the n concepts of the FCM. The matrix W has n rows and n columns where 
n equals the total number of distinct concepts of the FCM and the matrix diagonal is 
zero since it is assumed that no concept causes itself. 
The value of each one concept is influenced by the values of the connected 
concepts with the appropriate weights and by its previous value. So the value Ai for 
each concept Ci is calculated by the following rule:  
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where Ai is the activation level of concept Ci at time t+1, Aj is the activation 
level of concept Cj at time t, oldiA  is the activation level of concept Ci at time t, and 
Wji  is the weight of the interconnection between Cj and Ci, and f is a threshold 
function. 
Anew = f(Aold◦W) + Aold (2) 
So the new state vector Anew is computed by multiplying the previous state 
vector Aold by the weight matrix W. The new vector shows the effect of the change 
in the value of one concept in the whole Fuzzy Cognitive Map. But, equation (2) 
includes also, the old value of each concept, and so the FCM possesses memory 
capabilities and there is a smooth change after each new cycling of the FCM.  
The Fuzzy Cognitive Map is a useful method in modeling and control of 
complex systems which will help the designer of a system in decision analysis and 
strategic planning. It appears to be an appealing tool in the description of the 
supervisor of complex control systems, which can be complemented with other 
techniques and will lead to more sophisticated control systems [SGG]. 
 
5.8.2 Trust Control Modeling 
 
The Fuzzy Cognitive Map is a good method to analyze systems that are otherwise 
difficult to comprehend due to the complex relationships between their components. 
In this section, we introduce an adaptive trust control model via applying the theory 
of the FCM in order to illustrate the relationships among trust, its influencing 
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factors and the control modes used for managing it. Let us first introduce some 
notations. 
 
Notation 2: 
iQA  the ith quality attribute; 
jC  the jth control mode; 
iw  the importance rate of iQA ; 
iQAV  the value of iQA ; 
jC
V  the value of jC ; 
T  the value of trustworthiness; 
f the sigmoid threshold function; 
jicw  the influence factor of control mode jC  on iQA ; 
CjB  the selection factor of the control mode jC ; 
oldT  the old value of trustworthiness; 
old
QAiV  the old value of iQA ; 
old
C j
V  the old value of jC ; 
T∆  the change of trustworthiness value; 
kS  the kth composition of control modes; 
tr  the selection threshold; 
kS
SF  the selection factor of kS ; 
kT  the trustworthiness value regarding kS ; 
kQAiV ,  the value of iQA  regarding kS ; 
δ  the accepted change of trustworthiness value; 
ω  is a unit deduction factor; 
monitorV
iQA _  the value of iQA  generated through real system observation; 
predictV
iQA _  the value of iQA  generated by prediction; 
n  the total number of quality attributes; 
m  the total number of control modes; 
K  the total number of the composition of control modes; 
σ  the accepted error between monitorV
iQA _  and predictV iQA _ ; 
kd  the distance of kQAiV ,  and T  to tr ; 
 
A platform entity’s trustworthiness is influenced by a number of quality 
attributes ),...,1( niQAi = . These quality attributes are ensured or controlled through 
a number of control modes supported by the platform system ),...,1( mjC j = . A 
control mode contains a number of control mechanisms or operations that can be 
provided by the system. We assume that the control modes are not exclusive and 
that combinations of different modes are used. 
The model can be described with a graphical illustration using a Fuzzy 
Cognitive Map, as shown in Figure 5.9. There are three layers of nodes in the 
graph. The node in the top layer is the trustworthiness of the platform entity. The 
nodes located in the middle layer are the quality attributes of the entity, which have 
direct influence on the entity’s trustworthiness. The nodes at the bottom layer are 
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control modes that could be supported and applied inside the system. These control 
modes can control and thus improve the quality attributes. Therefore, they have 
indirect influence on the trustworthiness of the entity. 
 
 
inessTrustworth  
1QA  2QA  nQA  
1C  2C  mC  
T  
1QAV  2QAV  nQAV  
1C
V
 
2C
V
 
mC
V
 
1w  2w  nw  
11cw  
21cw  
22cw  
12cw  2mcw  
mn
cw
 
1C
B
 
2C
B
 
mC
B
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Graphical modeling of trust control 
 
Note that [ ]1,0,, ∈TVV
ji CQA , [ ]1,0∈iw , and [ ]1,1−∈jicw . oldT , oldQAiV  and oldC jV  are old 
value of T , 
iQAV , and jCV , respectively. 
oldTTT −=∆  stands for the change of 
trustworthiness value. 
jC
B  reflects the current system configuration on which 
control modes are applied. The trustworthiness value T  can be described as: 

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iw . Where iw  is a weight that indicates the importance rate of the 
quality attribute iQA  regarding how much this quality attribute is considered at the 
trust decision or assessment. The weight iw  can be decided based on the trustor’s 
criteria. We apply the Sigmoid function as the threshold function f: 
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(e.g. 2=α ), to map node values TVV
ji CQA ,,  into [0, 1]. The value of the quality 
attribute is denoted by 
iQAV . It can be calculated according to the following formula: 
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where jicw  is the influence factor of control mode jC  on iQA , jicw  is set based 
on the impact of jC  on iQA . Positive jicw  means a positive influence of jC  on iQA . 
Negative jicw  implies a negative influence of jC  on iQA . CjB  is the selection factor 
of the control mode jC , which can be either 1 if jC  is applied or 0 if jC  is not 
applied.  
The value of the control mode can be calculated using  ( )oldCCC jjj VBTfV +⋅= ,  (5) 
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where T  is the value of trustworthiness and CjB  is the selection factor of the 
control mode jC . 
 
5.8.3 Trust Control Mode Prediction and Selection 
 
The control modes are predicted through evaluating all possible modes and their 
compositions based on the proposed model using the prediction algorithm described 
below. As a standard for predicting new modes, we introduce a constant δ , which 
is the accepted T∆  that controls the iteration of the prediction. 
 
- For every composition of control modes, i.e. ),...,1( KkS k =∀ , while 
δ≥−=∆ oldkkk TTT , do ( )oldkCkCkkC jjj VBTfV ,,, +⋅=  
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The control modes are selected based on the control mode prediction results: 
- Calculate selection threshold ∑=
=
K
k
kTK
tr
1
1
; 
- Compare kQAiV ,  and kT  of kS  to tr , set selection factor 1=kSSF  
if trV kQAi ≥∀ , ∧ trTk ≥ ; set 1−=kSSF  if trV kQAi <∃ , ∨ trTk <∃ ; 
- For 1=∀
kS
SF , calculate the distance of kQAiV ,  and kT to tr  as 
},min{
,
trTtrVd kkQAk i −−= ; For 1−=∀ kSSF , calculate the distance 
of kQAiV ,  and kT to tr  as },max{ , trTtrVd kkQAk i −−=  only when 
trV kQAi <,  and trTk < ; 
- If 1=∃
kS
SF , select the best winner with the biggest kd ; else 
1−=∃
kS
SF , select the best loser with the smallest kd . 
Herein, the selection threshold ( tr ) is the average of trust value kT  of all 
),...,1( KkS k = , i.e. ∑=
=
K
k
kTK
tr
1
1
. ),...,1( KkS k =  can be expressed by the control mode 
selection factors 
jC
B , which represent which control mode is selected and applied in 
the system. The selection factor 1=
kS
SF  means that all the predicted kQAiV ,  and kT  
are above the threshold tr . While 1−=
kS
SF  means there is some predicted kQAiV ,  and 
kT  below the threshold tr . The selection algorithm selects the best control modes 
based on the absolute difference between kQAiV , , kT  and tr . For 1=∀ kSSF , it records 
the absolute difference between kQAiV , , kT  and tr  as the minimum 
},min{
,
trTtrVd kkQAk i −−= . For 1−=∀ kSSF , it records the absolute difference 
between kQAiV , , kT  and tr  as the maximum },max{ , trTtrVd kkQAk i −−= , only when 
trV kQAi <,  and trTk < . Thus, the algorithm can select the best winner if 1=∃ kSSF . 
Even though, there is no choice available, it is also possible for the algorithm to 
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select the best loser with the biggest kQAiV ,  and kT  below tr . Selecting the best loser 
is significant for the system to optimize the configurations of the control modes in 
order to re-predict and re-select a proper set of control modes. 
 
5.8.4 Adaptive Trust Control Model Adjustment 
 
It is important for the trust control model to reflect the real system situation and 
context precisely. The influencing factors of each control mode should be context-
aware. The trust control model should be dynamically maintained and optimized in 
order to reflect the real system situation. Thereby, it is sensitive to indicate the 
influence of each control mode on different quality attributes in a dynamically 
changed context. For example, when some malicious behaviors or attacks happen, 
the currently applied control modes can be found not feasible based on trust 
assessment. In this case, the influencing factors of the applied control modes should 
be adjusted in order to reflect the real system situation. Then, the system can 
automatically re-predict and re-select a set of new control modes in order to ensure 
the trustworthiness. In this way, the system can avoid using attacked or useless trust 
control modes in a special context. As can be seen from the above analysis, an 
adaptive trust control model is vital for supporting autonomic trust management in a 
component software platform.  
We apply observation based trust assessment as described in Section 5.7, which 
can play as the feedback for adaptive model adjustment. Herein, we use 
monitorV
iQA _  and predictV iQA _  to stand for iQAV  generated based on real system 
observation (i.e. the trust assessment result) and by prediction, respectively. 
Concretely, the influencing factor jicw  can be further adjusted based on two 
schemes in order to make it match real system situation. One of the schemes is an 
equal adjustment scheme. It holds a strategy that each control mode has the same 
impact on the deviation between monitorV
iQA _  and predictV iQA _ . In this scheme, all 
related jicw  will be adjusted equally. The other is an unequal adjustment scheme. It 
holds a strategy that the control mode with the biggest absolute influencing factor 
always impacts more on the deviation between monitorV
iQA _  and predictV iQA _ . In 
this scheme, we always select the biggest absolute influencing factor to adjust. 
Which one should be applied depends on experimental experience on the control 
mode’s influence on the quality attributes. In the schemes, ω  is a unit deduction 
factor and σ  is the accepted deviation between monitorV
iQA _  and predictV iQA _ . We 
suppose jC  with jicw  is currently applied in the system. The equal adjustment 
scheme is: 
- While σ>− predictVmonitorV
ii QAQA __ , do 
a) If predictVmonitorV
ii QAQA __ < , for jicw∀ , 
  ω−= jiji cwcw , if 1,1 −=−< jiji cwcw ; 
 Else, for jicw∀ ,  
  ω+= jiji cwcw , if 1,1 => jiji cwcw ; 
b) Run the control mode prediction function.  
The unequal adjustment scheme is the following: 
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- While σ>− predictVmonitorV
ii QAQA __ , do 
a) If predictVmonitorV
ii QAQA __ < , for )max( jicw , 
  ω−= jiji cwcw , if 1,1 −=−< jiji cwcw  (warning); 
 Else, ω+= jiji cwcw , if 1,1 => jiji cwcw  (warning); 
b) Run the control mode prediction function. 
 
5.8.5 Examples and Simulation Results 
 
We conducted simulations to prove the above modeling and algorithms. The 
simulations are based on a practical example, as shown in Figure 5.10. The 
trustworthiness of the trustee is influenced by three quality attributes: 1QA  - 
Security; 2QA  - Availability; 3QA  - Reliability, with important rates 6.01 =w , 
2.02 =w , and 2.03 =w , respectively. There are three control modes that could be 
provided by the system: 
• 1C : security mode 1 with light encryption and light negative influence on 
availability. 
• 2C : security mode 2 with strong encryption, but medium negative influence 
on availability. 
• 3C : fault management mode with positive improvement on availability and 
reliability. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Simulation configurations 
 
The influence of each control mode on the quality attributes is specified by the 
arc weights. Their initial values can be set based on the experimental results tested 
at the control mode development. The values in the square boxes are initial values 
of the nodes. In practice, the initial values can be set as asserted ones or expected 
ones, which are specified in the trustor’s criteria profile. Actually, the initial values 
have no influence on the final results of the prediction and selection based on the 
simulation experience. 
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Figure 5.11: Control mode prediction and selection result ( 2=α  and 0001.0=δ ) 
 
The simulation results are shown in Figure 5.11. In this case, there are seven 
control mode compositions: 1S  ( 0;0;1 321 === CCC BBB ); 2S  
( 0;1;0
321
=== CCC BBB ); 3S  ( 1;0;0 321 === CCC BBB ); 4S  ( 1;0;1 321 === CCC BBB ); 
5S  ( 1;1;0 321 === CCC BBB ); 6S  ( 0;1;1 321 === CCC BBB ); 7S  ( 1;1;1 321 === CCC BBB ). 
We can see that 4S  (the composition of 1C  and 3C ) is the best choice since both the 
quality attribute values and the trustworthiness value are above the threshold. 
If 4S  is applied but the assessed values of quality attributes based on runtime 
observation are not the same as the predicted ones (e.g. 946.0_
1
=predictVQA , 
899.0_
2
=predictVQA ; 956.0_3 =predictVQA ), the trust control model should be 
adjusted in order to reflect real system context. Supposed that the assessed 
monitorV
iQA _  are: 92.0_1 =monitorVQA , 70.0_2 =monitorVQA , and 
956.0_
3
=monitorVQA . In this case, the security attribute is a bit worse than 
prediction and the availability attribute is definitely predicted incorrectly. The 
mismatch indicates that the underlying model parameters do not reflect real system 
situation precisely. This could be caused by some attacks happening at the control 
mechanisms in 4S  with regard to ensuring the availability, or raised by limited 
resources shared by many system entities, or due to weaker influence of 4S  on the 
availability in practice than prediction. We conducted model adjustment based on 
the equal and unequal schemes, respectively. The adjustment simulation results are 
shown in Table 5.1. Both schemes can adjust the model with similar predicted 
iQAV  
to the assessment results, as shown in Table 5.2. The deviation between 
predictVQA _1  and monitorV iQA _  can be controlled through parameter σ . As can be 
seen from the simulation results, both schemes can adjust the influencing factors to 
make the prediction values of QA predictVQA _1  match the assessment results 
monitorV
iQA _  generated through observation. 
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Table 5.1: Trust control model adjustment results ( 20/,002.0 σωσ == ) 
 
Influencing 
factors 
jicw  
Original 
values of jicw  
Adjusted values of jicw  
based on equal adjustment 
scheme 
Adjusted values of jicw  
based on unequal 
adjustment scheme 
11cw  0.5 0.41 0.32 
12cw  -0.3 -0.54 -0.58 
13cw  0.1 0.1 0.1 
21cw  1.0 1.0 1.0 
22cw  -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
23cw  0.0 0.0 0.0 
31cw  0.0 -0.089 0.0 
32cw  0.5 0.26 0.30 
33cw  0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
Table 5.2: Prediction results after model adjustment 
 
QA 
names 
Old prediction values Predicted values after 
applying equal 
adjustment scheme 
Predicted values after 
applying unequal 
adjustment scheme 
1QA  0.9463 0.9220 0.9220 
2QA  0.8993 0.7015 0.7015 
3QA  0.9563 0.9563 0.9563 
 
We further run the control mode prediction and selection functions with two sets 
of adjusted jicw  listed in Table 5.1, respectively. The results show the system can 
not offer a good selection. This means that the system needs to re-configure its 
control modes in order to improve its trustworthiness. In both cases, the selection 
function indicates the best loser is 3S . We can further optimize the control model 
3S  for providing satisfied trust management configuration. The prediction and 
selection results after the model adjustment are shown in Figure 5.12. 
Furthermore, the simulation results show that the initial values of nodes have no 
influence on the simulation results. The importance rates have an impact on the 
final values of trustworthiness, and thus influence the control mode prediction and 
selection since the threshold for selection is the average of the trustworthiness 
values. The performance of the control model prediction is influenced by the 
number of control modes (i.e. K) and α . Generally, we expect 4≤K , otherwise the 
performance of the prediction could be low. That is also an important reason we 
apply the trust control mode, not the concrete trust control mechanisms into the 
model. In addition, the prediction results could also help optimize the 
configurations of the control modes. This is because the prediction results indicate 
the values of quality attributes. If some value of a quality attribute is below the 
threshold, the platform needs to re-configure the control modes in order to have 
more positive influence on this quality attribute. This is very useful if there is no 
solution from the control mode selection. In particular, this trust control model can 
also be applied to compare the feasibility or quality of different control mode 
configurations based on the prediction. With regard to the adaptive model 
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adjustment, both schemes can adjust the influencing factors to make the prediction 
values of QA match the assessment results generated through observation.  
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(a) Apply influencing factors adjusted based 
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Figure 5.12: Control mode prediction and selection results after model adjustment 
( 2=α  and 0001.0=δ ) (a) model adjusted based on equal adjustment scheme; (b) 
model adjusted based on unequal adjustment scheme 
 
5.8.6 Further Discussion 
 
Cooperation with trust assessment 
 
The adaptive trust control model will cooperate with the runtime trust assessment 
mechanism. In Section 5.7, we proposed a Subjective Logic based trust assessment 
mechanism. The output of trust assessment is a set of values which are expressed as 
opinions ( ),,( iiiQA udbV i =  and ),,( udbT = ).  
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In order to conduct trust control model adjustment, we need to map assessed 
values based on observation from three dimensions to a single dimension. We 
suggest to use formula iiQA ubV i += α  and ubT += α , where 5.0=α , as defined in 
[Jos01]. Apart from this, the mapped evaluation values need further transfer to the 
model values through using sigmoid function 
xe
xf
α−+
=
1
1)(  (e.g. 2=α ) before 
running the model adjustment function.  
In addition, the proposed adaptive trust control model can cooperate with 
various trust evaluation mechanisms. What we need to do is to map the evaluation 
values to the value scope of the proposed model. 
 
Two adjustment schemes 
 
We proposed two adjustment schemes. Both can adjust the model to reflect a real 
system situation. The equal adjustment scheme holds a strategy that each control 
mode has the same impact on the deviation between monitorV
iQA _  and 
predictV
iQA _ . While the unequal adjustment scheme holds a strategy that the 
control mode with the biggest absolute influencing factor always impacts more on 
the deviation between monitorV
iQA _  and predictV iQA _ . Which one should be applied 
depends on experimental experiences on the control mode’s influence on the 
different quality attributes. We can set an indicator for each control mode to specify 
the preference. In particular, if 0=jicw  means no influence on iQA , the unequal 
adjustment scheme is preferred. 
 
Resource consideration 
 
For some devices with limited resources, we should add additional checking steps 
in the implementation regarding resource management. Two checks are needed. 
One is conducted before running the prediction functions in order to find all 
possibly supported control modes. The other check is needed after the selection in 
order to ensure the resources required by the selected control modes can be satisfied 
by the system. If not, we could select the second best solution. Otherwise, the 
system will raise a warning. 
 
Effectiveness of trust control model 
 
The adaptive trust control model is proposed in order to support autonomic trust 
management for the component software platform. It is crucial that this model is 
effective. We analyze the effectiveness of the proposed model through four aspects 
as below. 
 
Correctness: showing how correct or comprehensive the trust model presents the 
trustworthiness. The proposed model considers not only direct influencing factors 
of trust, such as multiple quality attributes of the trustee, but also the impact of trust 
control mechanisms on trustworthiness. It reflects objective factors (e.g. the quality 
attributes), subjective factors (e.g. the important rates) and context that influence 
the trust decision. The context is reflected based on the model adjustment according 
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to the runtime observation results, thus overcome the difficulty of modeling context 
completely and precisely. This model is an extension of many existing trust models 
[ZMZ05, ThB06, SYH06, LVW04, ZWW05], thus it is more comprehensive. 
 
Preciseness: showing how close the trust model reflects a real situation. The 
proposed model can be adjusted based on the runtime trust assessment results. The 
preciseness of the adjustment can be controlled by the parameter σ , the accepted 
deviation between monitorV
iQA _  and predictV iQA _ . The smallerσ  is, the more 
precise the model. Herein, we assume that monitorV
iQA _  is a reliable value since it 
is generated based on runtime system monitoring and the trust assessment 
mechanism is protected by trusted computing technology.  
 
Robustness: how robust the trust model regarding malicious behaviors, mistakes 
and various attacks. The gist of our model is that it is adaptively adjusted based on 
the real system situation or context. Once there are some problems happening that 
may influence the trustworthiness, this model can be adaptively adjusted to reflect 
them. It will be possible to learn the performance or effectiveness of the applied 
control modes through this model. Thereby, it is possible to re-select other control 
modes to re-establish or ensure the trustworthiness. Even though there is no 
solution for trust management, the platform user will be informed. We note that the 
robustness is also related to the control mode configurations. This model could 
additionally help the platform administrator optimizing the configurations of the 
control modes. 
 
Adaptability (Timeliness): how fast the model can reflect the real situation and act 
accordingly. The proposed model can be dynamically maintained according to the 
real system context. For example, new control modes can be added and ineffective 
ones can be removed. The parameters of the model (e.g. jicw ) can be adjusted based 
on the model adjustment result. The adaptability is controlled by the parametersα , 
K , δ , σ , and 20/σω = . The parameters α , K  and δ  influence the speed of 
prediction. The smaller the parameter α , K  and/or the bigger the parameterδ  are, 
the faster the speed of prediction. But generally, δ  can not be set very big since it 
will influence correctness. The parameter K  can not be set very big since it will 
impact the prediction performance. Our suggested value is 4≤K . The parameters 
σ  and ω  are applied to control the speed of the model adjustment. The bigger the 
parameterσ  is, the faster the adjustment, but the worse the preciseness of the 
adjustment. With regard to the parameterω , the bigger it is, the faster the 
adjustment. But ω  can not be set too big since this may lead to missing a solution 
(i.e. the algorithm cannot provide an adjustment). Based on our simulation, we 
suggest setting 20/σω = . We should select σ  properly in order to keep preciseness 
and meanwhile ensure adaptability. In summary, adaptability is the most important 
factor that influences the effectiveness of the trust control model. 
 
Usability: how usable is the model with regard to human-computer interaction in 
practice. The proposed model applies a number of subjective policies of the trustor 
(e.g. the importance rates and the trust threshold). Generally, the trustor can be a 
system user, the system or a component. If the trustor is a user, he/she can set the 
87 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
policy through a user interface based on a default or suggested setting. If the trustor 
is the system, it can get a certified policy from a Third Trusted Party (TTP). If the 
trustor is a component, it can set its policy based on the CTM of the trustor 
component and the trustee component. There are many issues about usability, 
which could be an interesting topic worth further study. 
 
 
5.9 Remarks 
 
The methodologies described in Chapter 3 also instruct working out an autonomic 
trust management solution for the component software platform.  
By using the modeling methodology introduced in Section 3.2, the system can 
be modeled as a number of trusted domains – system entities. In order to build up 
the trust relationship among these entities, we applied both a ‘hard trust’ solution 
and a ‘soft trust’ solution.  
The ‘hard trust’ solution uses an embedded trust management framework that 
plays as the trustor entity’s delegate to manage the trustworthiness of the trustee 
entity. This trust management framework also supports applying a number of trust 
control mechanisms that can be used to ensure or sustain the trust relationships 
among the system entities. One important category of the trust control mechanisms 
is security related mechanisms, which include such mechanisms as encryption, 
decryption, access control mechanisms, authentication, hash code based integrity 
check, etc. 
Regarding the ‘soft trust’ solution, the trust assessment mechanism embedded in 
the decision/reason engine can assess the trustworthiness of a specified trustee 
entity based on runtime observation. In addition, the control mode prediction and 
selection mechanisms and the mechanisms for adaptive trust control model 
adjustment that are embedded in the selection engine can further support and 
enhance the autonomic management for the platform trustworthiness. This solution 
falls into approach (b) – create new component: a trust management framework to 
support autonomic trust management. In practice, this framework cooperates with 
other frameworks (e.g. resource management framework and security framework) 
to realize the whole system’s trust management. Therefore, this work is a 
significant attempt regarding the three emerging trends of trust modeling and 
management. 
The work described in Chapter 4 aims to improve the existing trusted computing 
technology at the platform layer of the mobile computing platform. It can provide a 
secure and integrated environment for the component software platform that is 
installed and run at the platform middleware layer. The mechanism for trust 
sustainability could be used to restrict any malicious changes that may influence the 
security of the component software platform. 
 
 
5.10 Summary 
 
This Chapter presented an autonomic trust management solution for a component 
software platform. It is also a significant attempt with regard to the emerging trends 
described in Chapter 2. We have identified the trust issues in the component 
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software system and briefly introduced our approach. We then developed a formal 
trust model to specify, evaluate, set up and ensure trust relationships amongst 
system entities. Based on this trust model, we further designed an autonomic trust 
management architecture that can adopt a number of algorithms to implement 
autonomic trust management. This design is compatible with the component 
software system architecture. Thus it can be easily deployed in practice in order to 
enhance the trustworthiness of the component software. In addition, the proposed 
trust management architecture will enable trust management for both system users 
and system internal entities since it supports managing the trust relationship 
between any two entities in the component software system. Therefore, it supports 
trust management for ‘All’. A more extended discussion is provided in Publication 
7 and [YPN07]. 
Furthermore, we proposed an adaptive trust control model for the trust control 
mode prediction and selection aiming at autonomic trust management for the 
component software platform. We made use of a Fuzzy Cognitive Map to model the 
relationships among the trust control modes, the quality attributes of the platform 
entity and its trustworthiness. In this model, the importance factors are set based on 
the trustor’s preference. The influencing factors of the control modes can be 
adaptively adjusted according to the trust assessment in order to reflect real system 
context and situation. Based on this model, we proposed the algorithms to conduct 
the control mode predication and selection. The simulation results show that this 
model is effective for predicting and selecting the suitable trust control modes for 
the system. It also helps improving the control mode configurations, especially 
when there is no solution from the prediction. In addition, this model is flexible to 
support any system entity’s autonomic trust management. The system entity can be 
a system component, a sub-system or the whole system. Thereby, this model can 
also support auto-selection of the trust control modes for all system entities. A more 
extended discussion of the issues is provided in Publication 8 and [YaP07]. 
Desirable emerging properties can be obtained by applying the proposed trust 
management solution into a mobile computing platform with component software 
support. These include enabling the trust assessment at runtime based on system 
monitoring of a number of quality attributes of the assessed entity; autonomic trust 
management on the basis of the performance prediction of trust control modes, the 
auto-selection of trust control modes and the adaptive adjustment of the trust 
control model through cooperation with the trust assessment. These emerging 
properties allow addressing trust at the system runtime better.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
Trust is playing and will continuously play an important role in mobile computing 
and communications. The rapid growth of new mobile networking paradigms and 
mobile Internet services is introducing new requirements and challenges to mobile 
computing platforms. Trust management is becoming an important issue for the 
mobile computing platforms.  
This dissertation studies methodologies and mechanisms of providing a 
trustworthy computing platform for mobile devices. In addition, we seek solutions 
to support trusted communications and collaboration among those platforms in a 
distributed and dynamic system. This dissertation contributes in four aspects. 
Firstly, it provides a comprehensive review of trust, trust modeling, trust 
evaluation and trust management. Based on the study of the state-of-the art, it 
identifies the emerging trends. The understanding generated from the literature 
study instructs our work towards solving special issues of trust regarding the mobile 
computing platforms. 
Secondly, this dissertation studies research methodologies for the purpose of our 
research objectives. We presented a conceptual architecture to clarify the structure 
of trust issues in the mobile domain and specify a number of key motivations. We 
also introduced a methodology to bridge the domains of trust in mobile computing 
and communications. This methodology benefits system analysis and design for 
finding trust issues and identifying security problems. The concrete approaches for 
bridging the trust gaps among domains instruct how to seek a concrete solution 
regarding trust management for mobile computing platforms. Furthermore, we 
applied our methodologies into practice to demonstrate their applicability, 
expressiveness and advantages. 
Thirdly, the dissertation presents a mechanism to sustain trust among computing 
platforms on the basis of Root Trust (RT). It creates trust based on the attestation of 
the RT module at the trustee and controls its sustainability according to the pre-
defined conditions. Those conditions are approved by both the trustor and the 
trustee at the time of trust establishment and enforced through the use of the pre-
attested RT module until the intended purpose is fulfilled. This work extends the 
trust model from static to dynamic. Thus, it develops the notion of using trust 
management not only for trust assessment but also for trust sustainability. The 
proposed mechanism could be applied in many real applications for trusted services 
and communications, for example, trust collaboration in P2P systems and trust 
management in mobile enterprise networking. It could work as an extension of 
future TC platform to support various applications with enhanced flexibility. 
Finally, the dissertation develops an autonomic trust management solution for a 
component software system. It is also a significant attempt with regard to the three 
emerging trends. We developed a formal trust model to specify, evaluate, set up and 
ensure trust relationships amongst system entities. Based on this trust model, we 
designed an autonomic trust management architecture that can adopt a number of 
algorithms for autonomic trust management. These algorithms are designed based 
on an adaptive trust control model. Desirable emerging properties can be obtained 
by applying the proposed trust management solution into a mobile computing 
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platform with component software support. These include enabling the trust 
assessment at runtime based on system monitoring of a number of quality attributes 
of the assessed entity; autonomic trust management on the basis of the performance 
prediction of trust control modes, the auto-selection of trust control modes and the 
adaptive adjustment of the trust control model through cooperation with the trust 
assessment. These emerging properties allow addressing trust at the component 
software system runtime better. 
Particularly, the proposed methodologies and mechanisms in this dissertation 
can cooperate altogether to provide a meaningful approach to manage trust of 
mobile computing platforms. First of all, the conceptual architecture based research 
method provides us a clear guideline of research steps and helps us analyze research 
motivations in the area of mobile computing. At the design stage of a trustworthy 
mobile system or platform, the methodology for bridging different domains of trust 
can help system designers working out a trustworthy system architecture that can 
overcome potential trust deficiencies among system components [YaZ07]. In order 
to support trustworthy collaborations and communications among mobile 
computing platforms in a mobile system, the mechanism to sustain trust among 
computing platforms on the basis of Root Trust can be applied to satisfy the trust 
requirements and conditions of the trustor platform on the trustee platform. 
Furthermore, the approach proposed for autonomic trust management can be 
deployed for building up a trustworthy platform through autonomic platform 
management on any trust relationship among platform entities based on the 
platform’s competence according to high-level trust policies. From trust problem 
discovery, the analysis and design of a trustworthy mobile system to trustworthy 
mobile platform or system execution and collaboration, this dissertation provides a 
series of methodologies or mechanisms for managing trust for mobile computing 
platforms in a dynamically changed environment. 
More importantly, the mechanisms proposed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 can 
cooperate together to realize autonomic trust management across mobile computing 
platforms [YaP07a]. In this case, the trust conditions are set based on the trust 
policies or criteria specified by the trustor entity located in one mobile computing 
platform, while the trustee entity is located in another remote platform. The trust 
policies or criteria are registered at the trustee platform’s trust management 
framework and ensured through the trust sustaining mechanism based on the Root 
Trust module. The autonomic trust management on the trustee entity is conducted 
based on the approach proposed in Chapter 5 according to the trustee platform’s 
competence. If trust can not be managed, the trustor entity could be notified. This 
integrated approach is significant to automatically manage holistic trust reflected by 
multiple quality attributes for mobile Internet services and applications. In addition, 
the proposed methodologies and mechanisms in this dissertation can be further 
extended to apply into any digital computing platform or system.  
Notably, this dissertation proposed two methods for trust sustainability. One is 
Root Trust module based ‘hard trust’ solution. This method is more suitable for 
supporting trustworthy communications or collaborations among a number of 
mobile computing platforms in a distributed system. Another method is trust 
evaluation based autonomic trust management, which is a ‘soft trust’ solution. This 
method provides intelligence to ensure an open platform’s trustworthiness 
according to the platform’s competence. These two methods can be applied 
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independently or cooperate together to make the mobile computing platforms more 
trustworthy. 
Trust management for mobile computing platforms is a wide research area. This 
dissertation mainly focuses on discussing several important topics related to it. 
There are still many interesting issues worth further study and deep research. In 
what follows, we propose several pieces of work we would like to conduct in the 
near future. 
Regarding the TC platform based solution for trustworthy communications, 
immediate future work includes performance study of the proposed mechanism and 
implementation of the trust sustainability mechanism on a mobile computing 
platform in order to support mobile P2P collaboration and trusted mobile enterprise 
networking.  
Regarding autonomic trust management for the component software platform, 
we will further optimize the algorithms and study the performance of model 
adjustment schemes and attempt to implement the adaptive trust control model and 
related algorithms in the Trust4All platform. What is more, we will further extend 
the runtime trust management to the download trust management, and thus achieve 
a comprehensive trust management solution for component software. On the other 
hand, how to support multiple trustors’ trust management requests is an interesting 
and crucial issue worthy of special study. 
Apart from those mentioned above, we found that little work has been conducted 
regarding human-device interaction in order to support trust management, 
especially in the mobile domain. Embedding personal criteria of trust regarding 
different events into the device requires interaction between the end user and his/her 
device. This would require a friendly user interface for the device to collect useful 
information for trust evaluation and present the evaluation results in a 
comprehensive manner to the user. Human-device interaction for trust management 
could be an interesting research topic worth our efforts. 
92 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
 
93 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
REFERENCES 
 
 
 
 
[AbD01] K. Aberer, and Z. Despotovic, “Managing trust in a peer-to-peer 
information system,” in Proceedings of ACM Conf. Information and 
Knowledge Management (CIKM), 2001. 
 
[ALR04] A.Avizienis, J.-C. Laprie, B. Randell, and C. Landwehr, “Basic concepts 
and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing,” IEEE Transactions 
on Dependable and Secure Computing, Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp.11-33, Jan. 
2004. 
 
[BaS03] A. Baldwin, and S. Shiu, “Hardware security appliances for trust,” in 
Proceedings of the First International Conference of Trust Management 
(iTrust 2003), LNCS 2692, pp. 46-58, Crete, Greece, May 2003. 
 
[BFL96] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy, “Decentralized trust 
management,” in Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security and 
Privacy, pp.164-173, May 1996. 
 
[BIK02] M. Blaze, J. Ioannidis, and A. D. Keromytis, “Trust management for 
Ipsec,” ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 5, 
No. 2, pp.95-118, May 2002. 
 
[BIK03] M. Blaze, J. Ioannidis, and A. D. Keromytis, “Experience with the 
KeyNote trust management system: applications and future directions,” 
in Proceedings of the First International Conference of Trust 
Management (iTrust 2003), LNCS 2692, pp. 284-300, Crete, Greece, 
May 2003. 
 
[BMM05] S. Banerjee, C. A. Mattmann, N. Medvidovic, and L. Golubchik, 
“Leveraging architectural models to inject trust into software systems”, 
ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes , in Proceedings of the 
2005 workshop on software engineering for secure systems—building 
trustworthy applications SESS '05, Vol. 30, Issue 4, 2005. 
 
[BoH91] S. Boon, and J. Holmes, “The dynamics of interpersonal trust: Resolving 
uncertainty in the face of risk,” in R. Hinde, 1991. 
 
[CFP03] C. Castelfranchi, R. Falcone, and G. Pezzulo, “Integrating trustfulness 
and decision using fuzzy cognitive maps,” in Proceedings of the First 
International Conference of Trust Management (iTrust 2003), LNCS 
2692, pp. 195-210, Crete, Greece, May 2003. 
 
[ChM02] K. H. Cheung, and J. Misic, “On virtual private network security design 
issues,” Computer Networks, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 165-179, Feb. 2002. 
94 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
 
[ChW03] K. Chopra, and W. A. Wallace, “Trust in electronic environments,” in 
Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences (HICSS’03), 2003. 
 
[CKW03] C. L. Corritore, B. Kracher and S. Wiedenbeck, “On-line trust: concepts, 
evolving themes, a model,” International Journal of Human-Computer 
Studies, Trust and Technology, Vol. 58, Issue 6, pp. 737-758, June 2003. 
 
[Dav02] P. T. Davis, “TCPA: who can you trust,” EDPACS: the EDP Audit, 
Control and Security Newsletter, Dec. 2002. 
 
[Den93] DE Denning, “A new paradigm for trusted systems”, in Proceedings of 
the IEEE New Paradigms Workshop, 1993. 
 
[Dey01] A. K. Dey, “Understanding and using context”, Personal and 
Ubiquitous Computing Journal, Vol. 5, pp. 4-7, 2001. 
 
[ELM03] P. England, B. Lampson, J. Manferdelli, M. Peinado, and B. Willman, 
“A trusted open platform,” IEEE Computer Society, pp. 55-62, July 
2003. 
 
[FaC05] R. Falcone, and C. Castelfranchi, “Socio-cognitive model of trust,” 
Encyclopedia of Information Science and Technology, pp. 2534-2538, 
2005. 
 
[FDK02] P. Fenkam, S. Dustdar, E. Kirda, G. Reif, and H. Gall, “Towards an 
access control system for mobile peer-to-peer collaborative 
environments”, in Proceedings of Eleventh IEEE International 
Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative 
Enterprises, pp. 95-100, June 2002. 
 
[Fel03] E. W. Felten, “Understanding trusted computing: will its benefits 
outweigh its drawbacks?” IEEE Security & Privacy, Vol.1, No.3, pp. 60-
62, May-June 2003. 
 
[Gam90] D. Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?” In, Trust: Making and breaking 
Cooperative Relations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990. 
 
[GrS00] T. Grandison, and M. Sloman, “A survey of trust in internet 
applications,” IEEE Communications and Survey, Fourth Quarter, 3(4), 
pp. 2-16, 2000. 
 
[GrS03] T. Grandison, and M. Sloman, “Trust management tools for internet 
applications,” in Proceedings of the First International Conference of 
Trust Management (iTrust 2003), LNCS 2692, pp. 91-107, Crete, 
Greece, May 2003. 
 
95 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
[GuK04] R. Guha, and R. Kumar, “Propagation of trust and distrust,” in 
Proceedings of the 13th international conference on World Wide Web, 
pp. 403-412, ACM Press, 2004. 
 
[HaD05] T. Hardjono, and L. R. Dondeti, “Security in Wireless LANS and 
MANS (Artech House Computer Security)”, Artech House Inc., 2005. 
 
[HAM05] H. Hamed, E. Al-Shaer, and W. Marrero, “Modeling and verification of 
IPSec and VPN security policies”, 13th IEEE International Conference 
on Network Protocols, pp. 259 – 278, Nov. 2005. 
 
[HaR06] W. Hasselbring, and R. Reussner, “Toward trustworthy software 
systems,” IEEE Computer, Vol. 39, Issue 4, pp. 91-92, April 2006. 
 
[Her99] E. Herscovitz, “Secure virtual private networks: the future of data 
communications,” International Journal of Network Management, Vol. 
9, Issue 4, Aug. 1999. 
 
[Her01] P. Herrmann, “Trust-Based procurement support for software 
components,” in Proceedings of the 4th
 
International Conference of 
Electronic Commerce Research (ICECR04), pp. 505-514, Dallas, 2001. 
 
[Her03] P. Herrmann, “Trust-based protection of software component users and 
designers,” in Proceedings of the First International Conference of 
Trust Management (iTrust 2003), LNCS 2692, pp. 75-90, Crete, Greece, 
May 2003. 
 
[JHK05] H. Jameel, L. X. Hung, U. Kalim, A. Sajjad, S. Lee; and Y. Lee, “A trust 
model for ubiquitous systems based on vectors of trust values,” in 
Proceedings of the seventh IEEE International Symposium on 
Multimedia, pp. 674-679, Dec. 2005. 
 
[Hua02] A. B. Huang, “The trusted OC: skin-deep security”, Computer, Vol. 35, 
No.10, pp. 103-105, Oct. 2002. 
 
[JIB05] A. Jøsang, R. Ismail, and C. Boyd, “A survey of trust and reputation 
systems for online service provision,” Decision Support Systems, 2005. 
 
[JoK98] A. Jøsang and S. J. Knapskog, “A metric for trusted systems,” in 
Proceedings of the 21st National Security Conference, NSA 1998. 
 
[Jos99] A. Jøsang, “An algebra for assessing trust in certification chains,” in 
J.Kochmar, editor, Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems 
Security Symposium (NDSS'99), The Internet Society, 1999. 
 
[Jos01] A. Josang, “A logic for uncertain probabilities,” International Journal of 
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, Vol. 9, No. 3, 
pp. 279-311, 2001. 
 
96 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
[JoT03] A. Jøsang, and N. Tran, “Trust management for e-commerce,” in 
Proceedings Virtual Banking 2000, DSTC University report, 2003. 
 
[Kos86] B. Kosko, “Fuzzy Cognitive Maps,” International Journal Man-
Machine Studies, Vol.24, pp. 65-75, 1986. 
 
[KSG03] S. Kamvar, M. Scholsser, and H. Garcia-Molina, “The EigenTrust 
algorithm for reputation management in P2P networks,” in Proceedings 
of 12th International Conference of World Wide Web, May 2003. 
 
[KSP01] G. Kortuem, J. Schneider, D. Preuitt, T. G. C. Thompson, S. Fickas, and 
Z. Segall, “When peer-to-peer comes face-to-face: collaborative peer-to-
peer computing in mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the First 
International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P01), Aug. 
2001. 
 
[LiS05] Z. Liang, and W. Shi, “PET: A PErsonalized trust model with reputation 
and risk evaluation for P2P resource sharing”, in Proceedings of the 38th 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, pp. 201b-
201b, Jan. 2005. 
 
[LJT04] Z. Liu, A. W. Joy, and R. A. Thompson, “A dynamic trust model for 
mobile ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of 10th IEEE International 
Workshop on Future Trends of Distributed Computing Systems (FTDCS 
2004), pp. 80-85, May 2004. 
 
[LMA02] M. Lik, M. Mojdeh, and H. Ari, “A computational model of trust and 
reputation,” in Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International 
Conference on System sciences, Jan. 2002. 
 
[LSB03] S. Lee, R. Sherwood, and B. Bhattacharjee, “Cooperative peer groups in 
NICE,” in Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Computer 
Communications (INFOCOM 03), IEEE CS Press, pp. 1272-1282, 2003. 
 
[LVW04] C. Lin, V. Varadharajan, Y. Wang, and V. Pruthi, “Enhancing Grid 
security with trust management”, in Proceedings of IEEE International 
Conference on Services Computing (SCC 2004), pp. 303-310, Sept. 
2004. 
 
[Man98] D. W. Manchala, “Trust metrics, models and protocols for electronic 
commerce transactions,”in Proceedings of 18th IEEE International 
Conference on Distributed Computing System, pp. 312-321, May 1998. 
 
[Man00] D. W. Manchala, “E-commerce trust metrics and models,” IEEE 
Internet Computing, Vol.4, No.2, pp. 36-44, 2000. 
 
[Mau96] U. Maurer, “Modeling a public-key infrastructure,” in Proceedings of 
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, LNCS 1146, 
pp. 325–350, 1996. 
97 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
 
[McC00] D. H. McKnight, and N. L. Chervany, “What is trust? a conceptual 
analysis and an interdisciplinary model,” in Proceedings of the 2000 
Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCI2000), Aug. 2000. 
 
[McC03] D. H. McKnight, and N. L. Chervany, “The meanings of trust,” UMN 
university report, 2003. http://www.misrc.umn.edu/wpaper/wp96-
04.htm 
 
[MDS95] R. C. Mayer, J. H. Davis and F. D. Schoorman, “An integrative model of 
organizational trust,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 20, No 3, 
pp. 709-734, 1995. 
 
[Mui03] L. Mui. Computational Models of Trust and Reputation: Agents, 
Evolutionary Games, and Social Networks. PhD thesis, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 2003. 
 
[PaL] Personal contact with Lauri Paatero with regard to the concept of secure 
environment, 2003. 
 
[PaS02] J. Park, and R. Sandhu, “Towards usage control models: beyond 
traditional access control,” in Proceedings of the seventh ACM 
Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, California, 
USA, 2002. 
 
[Per99] R. Perlman, “An overview of PKI trust models”, IEEE Network, Vol.13, 
No.6, pp. 38-43, Nov.-Dec. 1999. 
 
[Reg03] K, Regan, “Secure VPN design considerations,” Network Security, pp. 
5-10, May 2003. 
 
[ReS98] M. K. Reiter, and S. G. Stubblebine, “Resilient authentication using Path 
independence,” IEEE Transaction on Computer, Vol. 47, No. 12, pp. 
1351-1362, Dec. 1998. 
 
[ReZ02] P. Resnick, and R. Zeckhauser, “Trust among strangers in Internet 
transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay’s reputation system,” in 
Advances in Applied Microeconomics: The Economics of the Internet 
and E-Commerce, Vol. 11, In M. Baye, Ed., Elsevier, pp. 127-157, Nov. 
2002. 
 
[RST] Robocop, Space4U and Trust4All website: 
https://nlsvr2.ehv.campus.philips.com/ 
 
[SGG] C. D. Stylios, V. C. Georgopoulos, and P. P. Groumpos, “The use of 
fuzzy cognitive maps in modeling systems”, 
http://med.ee.nd.edu/MED5/PAPERS/067/067.PDF 
 
98 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
[SHZ05] S. Song, K. Hwang, R. Zhou, and Y.-K. Kwok, “Trusted P2P 
transactions with fuzzy reputation aggregation,” IEEE Internet 
Computing, Vol. 9, Issue 6, pp. 24-34, Nov.-Dec. 2005. 
 
[SiL03] A. Singh, and L. Liu, “TrustMe: anonymous management of trust 
relationships in decentralized P2P systems,” in IEEE International 
Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, pp. 142-149, 2003. 
 
[SL] http://sky.fit.qut.edu.au/~josang/sl/demo/Op.html. 
 
[SLW03] R. Shan, S. Li, M. Wang, and J. Li, “Network security policy for large-
scale VPN,” International Conference on Communication Technology 
Proceedings, ICCT 2003, Vol. 1, pp. 217-220, April 2003. 
 
[SYH06] Y. Sun, W. Yu, Z. Han, and K.J.R. Liu, “Information theoretic 
framework of trust modeling and evaluation for ad hoc networks,” IEEE 
Journal on Selected Area in Communications, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 305-
317, Feb. 2006. 
 
[TaT98] Y. Tan, and W. Thoen, “Toward a generic model of trust for electronic 
commerce,” International Journal of Electronic Commerce, Vol.5, 
No.2, pp. 61-74, 1998. 
 
[Tcg03] TCG TPM Specification v1.2, 2003. 
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/TPM/  
 
[ThB06] G. Theodorakopoulos, and J.S. Baras, “On trust models and trust 
evaluation metrics for ad hoc networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected 
Areas in Communications, Vol. 24, Issue 2, pp. 318-328, Feb. 2006. 
 
[TLU06] S. Toivonen, G. Lenzini, and I. Uusitalo, “Context-aware 
trustworthiness evaluation with indirect knowledge,” Models of Trust for 
the Web (MTW'06), Edinburgh, Scotland, May 2006. 
 
[Twi03] A. Twigg, “A subjective approach to routing in P2P and ad hoc 
networks,” in Proceedings of the First International Conference of Trust 
Management (iTrust 2003), LNCS 2692, pp. 225-238, Crete, Greece, 
May 2003. 
 
[Vau03] S.J. Vaughan-Nichols, “How trustworthy is trusted computing?” 
Computer, Vol. 36, Issue 3, Mar. 2003. 
 
[WaS05] K. Walsh, and E. G. Sirer, “Fighting peer-to-peer SPAM and decoys 
with object reputation,” in Proceedings of the Third Workshop on the 
Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PECON), pp. 138-143, 
Philadelphia, PA, Aug. 2005. 
 
99 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
[WaV05] Y. Wang, and V. Varadharajan, “Trust2: developing trust in peer-to-peer 
environments,” IEEE International Conference on Services Computing, 
Vol. 1, pp. 24-31, July 2005. 
 
[WSC88] D. Wood, V. Stoss, L. Chan-Lizardo, G. S. Papacostas, and M. E. 
Stinson, “Virtual private networks,” International Conference on 
Private Switching Systems and Networks, pp. 132-136, June 1988. 
 
[XiL03] L. Xiong, and L. Liu, “A reputation-based trust model for peer-to-peer 
e-commerce communities,” IEEE International Conference on E-
Commerce, CEC 2003, pp. 275-284, 2003. 
 
[XiL04] L. Xiong, and L. Liu, “PeerTrust: supporting reputation-based trust for 
peer-to-peer electronic communities,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge 
and Data Engineering, Vol. 16, Issue 7, pp.843-857, July 2004. 
 
[YaC03] Z. Yan, and P. Cofta, “A method or system to establish and maintain 
conditional trust by stating signal of distrust,” Patent Application, 
10/637,813 (US), 2003. 
 
[Yan06] Z. Yan, “Predicting trustworthiness for component software,” Patent 
Application, PCT/IB2007/053466, 2006. 
 
[Yan07] Z. Yan, “Predicting trustworthiness for component software”, In 
Proceedings of IEEE 3rd International Workshop on Security, Privacy 
and Trust in Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (SecPerU07), held in 
conjunction with IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Services 
2007, pp. 1-6, Turkey, July 2007. 
 
[YaP07] Z. Yan, and C. Prehofer, “An adaptive trust control model for a 
trustworthy software component platform”, In Proceedings of the 4th 
International Conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing 
(ATC2007), LNCS 4610, pp. 226-238, China, July 2007. 
 
[YaP07a] Z. Yan, and C. Prehofer, “Autonomic trust management for a 
trustworthy system,” Patent Application, 059864.01347 (US), 2007. 
 
[YaZ07] Z. Yan, and P. Zhang, “Bridging disjoint trusted domains into a 
trustworthy system”, In Proceedings of the 7th WSEAS International 
Conference on Applied Informatics and Communications (AIC’07), 
Greece, Aug. 2007. 
 
[YPN07] Z. Yan, C. Prehofer, and V. Niemi, “Trust4All: a trustworthy 
middleware platform for component software”, In Proceedings of the 
7th WSEAS International Conference on Applied Informatics and 
Communications (AIC’07), Greece, Aug. 2007. 
 
100 
TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
[YZV03] Z. Yan, P. Zhang, and T. Virtanen, “Trust evaluation based security 
solution in ad hoc networks,” In Proceedings of the 7th Nordic 
Workshop on Secure IT Systems (NordSec03), Norway, Oct. 2003.  
 
[ZhH99] L. Zhou, and Z.J. Haas, “Securing ad hoc networks”, IEEE Network, 
13(6), pp. 24-30, Nov./Dec. 1999. 
 
[ZhY03] P. Zhang, and Z. Yan, “Virtual private network based on root-trust 
module computing platforms, Patent Application, 60/519,343 (US), 
2003. 
 
[ZJM05] M. Zhou, W. Jiao, and H. Mei, “Customizable framework for managing 
trusted components deployed on middleware,” in Proceedings of 10th 
IEEE International Conference Engineering of Complex Computer 
Systems ICECCS 2005, pp. 283-291, June 2005. 
 
[ZMZ05] M. Zhou, H. Mei, and L. Zhang, “A multi-property trust model for 
reconfiguring component software,” Fifth International Conference on 
Quality Software QAIC2005, pp. 142-149, Sept. 2005. 
 
[ZWW05] Z. Zhang, X. Wang, and Y. Wang, “A P2P global trust model based on 
recommendation,” in Proceedings of 2005 International Conference on 
Machine Learning and Cybernetics, Vol. 7, pp. 3975-3980, Aug. 2005. 
